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The adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, its rapid entry into force in November 
2016 following ratification by a critical mass of countries, and  subsequent adoption of a 
detailed rulebook for its implementation in December 2018 in Katowice – ushered in a new era 
of international cooperation on climate change. If the 2°C goal is to be achieved, massive 
improvements in energy efficiency, a substantial scale-up in renewable energy production, and 
enhanced access to clean energy technologies will be required. This calls for unprecedented 
efforts across all areas of socioeconomic activity, and thus also depends on support from other 
international regimes. The issues of policy and regime coherence assume particular importance 
vis-à-vis the international trading system, given that trade has an important role to play 
towards achievement of the Paris goals – both directly and indirectly. The significant surge in 
WTO disputes pertaining to climate change and clean energy over the past several years is 
indicative of the tensions that are brewing at the interface between national climate policies 
and measures, on the one hand, and international legal regimes pertaining to trade, on the 
other. With the increasing importance of national measures following the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, synergies and conflicts can be expected to change over time. Leaving the fate of 
climate-related actions to the WTO dispute settlement system is an option that is associated 
with risks and uncertainty, and could lead to a chilling effect on investment in the sector. That 
explains the importance of exploring the various ways in which trade policies and frameworks 
can create a more favourable environment for advancing the objectives of the Paris Agreement 
and their implementation. Based on an extensive literature review and a series of interviews 
with policymakers, trade law experts, and other stakeholders, and our own analysis, we have 
identified a set of options for improved alignment of the trade and climate regimes. These 
include general options addressing the link between trade and climate change, as well as 
options specifically related to border carbon adjustments (BCAs) and fossil fuel subsidies. Each 
of the proposed policy options is analysed with a focus on their political feasibility in the short 
term. In addition, where possible, we examine factors that may increase the utility and 
desirability of options, including their potential for reducing legal uncertainty. Based on this 
analysis, the article concludes with a set of recommendations for future policy reform.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
December 2015 saw the adoption of the Paris Agreement1 at COP21, which sets the aim of 
keeping the global temperature increase from pre-industrial levels well below 2°C and pursuing 
efforts to limit it to 1.5°C.2 The Paris Agreement entered into force in November 2016, 
following the historically swift ratification by a critical mass of countries. Subsequently, at the 
24th Conference of the Parties (COP) held in December 2018 in Katowice, the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted a detailed 
rulebook for implementing the Paris Agreement,3 thus heralding a new era of international 
cooperation on climate change. The Paris Agreement established a new international framework 
for the parties to the UNFCCC from 2020 onwards. The new regime is characterized by more 
universal efforts on climate change compared to the Kyoto Protocol, with the new agreement 
applying to both developed and developing countries. At the same time, the Agreement marks 
a transition towards a more bottom-up architecture for international climate cooperation. 
Central to this bottom-up approach is a system of national climate pledges, called nationally 
determined contributions, or NDCs. In other words, the Paris Agreement requires its parties to 
make their own plans on climate change mitigation, adaptation and other related areas. 
Importantly, the built-in flexibility and bottom-up nature of the Paris architecture are 
characterized by at least two major risks: (a) there is no certainty that the bottom-up pledges 
made by parties  would add up to what is required to achieve the Paris Agreement’s 2°C goal. 
(b) The architecture may be recipe for some parties to move ahead with ambitious climate action 
while others lag behind. In such a scenario, countries doing little may end up benefiting from 
arduous actions undertaken by others. For instance, in the ultimate free-ride, the US will 
withdraw completely from the Paris Agreement in 2020, demanding others do more. 
Indeed, parties to the UNFCCC have pledged climate actions that differ widely in 
ambition, nature and scope, and, absent strong centralized enforcement, will arguably face very 
uneven implementation. The extent of challenges becomes clearer when judged in light of the 
fact that the aggregate pledges are far from adequate to keep the global temperature rise well 
below 2°C, let alone the more ambitious 1.5°C goal.4 
Still, the Paris Agreement also creates room for countries to ratchet-up ambition in the 
future. The question then is how to strengthen actions so that emissions drop sharply once the 
Paris framework takes effect in 2020. This will require considerable reductions of fossil fuel 
use, widespread improvements in energy efficiency, a significant scale-up in the production of 
renewable energy, and enhanced access to clean energy technologies. Advancing such a multi-
pronged agenda calls for unprecedented efforts across all areas of socioeconomic activity. It 
                                                 
 
1 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first 
session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015 Addendum Part two: Action taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Decision 1/CP.21 (January 29, 2016) 
<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf> 
2 For an assessment of the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global 
greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate 
change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
IPCC Doc., Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policymakers (2018) < 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2018/07/SR15_SPM_version_stand_alone_LR.pdf> 
3 See < https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/katowice-climate-package> 
4 U.N. Environment, United Nations Environment Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2018, < 
http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullReport_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAll
owed=y> 
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also requires support from other international regimes, as rules that are working at cross-
purposes may hamper climate action.  
Policy and regime coherence are particularly important in the context of the 
international trade system. This is due to the multiple interlinkages between the trade and 
climate regimes. Trade has an important role to play towards the achievement of the Paris goals 
- both indirectly and directly. Indirectly, taking the requisite degree of climate action will 
require a major overhaul of domestic policies and measures, which may end up having 
significant cross-border trade effects, even though they are primarily intended as domestic 
measures. Besides, in implementing their NDCs, countries may opt for applying various ‘direct’ 
trade measures such as removing or reducing tariffs on environmental goods and services; 
developing technical standards for low-carbon products traded across borders; international 
transfer of climate-friendly technologies; application of border carbon adjustments; and so on. 
Notably, trade-related elements feature prominently in climate contributions under the Paris 
Agreement. According to a March 2017 study,5 among all the NDCs submitted around 45 
percent included a direct reference to trade or trade measures, whereas around 22 percent 
included trade measures that were specifically geared towards fostering mitigation. While 
around 6 percent NDCs mentioned a reduction of trade barriers, around 11 percent entailed a 
reference to the regulation of trade on climate grounds. Indeed, with more ambitious NDCs 
expected in the future, trade-related climate measures are not only likely to remain in the 
spotlight, but may also assume increasing significance. 
National climate policy measures with direct or indirect trade implications stand the risk 
of colliding with the rules and requirements put forward by the trade regimes. Such concerns 
have emerged particularly in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This is not 
unexpected, given that there are certain fundamental differences between the UNFCCC and the 
WTO regimes. Climate change could be considered as an extreme case of market failure — the 
failure to incorporate the damage done by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions into the prices of 
goods and services—creating grounds for government intervention to correct these market 
failures. Governments generally prefer to have great flexibility in the choice of national 
instruments to correct market failures. This is mainly because they need to balance the 
economic characteristics of alternative measures against their political acceptability. By 
contrast, the trade rules embodied in the WTO agreements presuppose a world of market 
economies and attempt to discipline government failures that lead to economic distortions with 
the flavour of mercantilism and protectionism. Such fundamental differences underlying the 
two regimes entail potential for conflicts.6 
As climate policy has become a major international policy field, its standing vis-à-vis 
the well-established WTO regime is changing rapidly, with climate policy makers increasingly 
becoming apprehensive that WTO law is curtailing their room for maneuver to implement 
domestic climate policies effectively. 7 On the other hand, concerns have also been raised by 
some countries about the use of trade-related climate measures for ‘alleged’ protectionist 
purposes. 8 The significant surge in WTO disputes pertaining to climate change and clean 
                                                 
 
5 Clara Brandi, Trade Elements in Countries’ Climate Contributions under the Paris Agreement, 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD) (2017). 
6 G.C. Hufbauer & J. Kim, The World Trade Organization and Climate Change: Challenges and Options, 
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (2009), at 5. 
 
7 See, e.g. Henry Derwent, What Has Climate to Fear from Trade? THE E15 INITIATIVE, ICTSD AND WORLD 
ECONOMIC FORUM (2015).   
8 See, e.g. M. Khor, Challenges of the Green Economy Concept and Policies in the Context of Sustainable 
Development, Poverty and Equity (n.d.), http://purochioe.rrojasdatabank.info/transition-4.pdf 
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energy over the past several years9 is indicative of the tension that is increasingly brewing up 
in the interface between national climate policies and measures on the one hand and 
international legal regimes pertaining to trade, on the other. With the increasing importance of 
national measures following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, synergies and conflicts can 
be expected to change over time. 
Leaving the fate of climate-related actions to the WTO dispute settlement system is an 
option that is associated with risks and uncertainty, and could lead to a chilling effect on 
investment in the sector. Ensuring coherence between trade and climate policy has also become 
more important in the context of regional and so-called ‘mega-regional’ trade agreements.10 
Hence, it is important to explore the various ways in which trade policies and frameworks could 
create a more favorable environment for advancing the objectives of the Paris Agreement and 
their implementation. The inclusion of environmental and climate policy provisions in regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) further shows that there is a demand for policy coordination. 
There is no dearth of options in this regard. For instance, the E15 Expert Group on 
Measures to Address Climate Change and the Trade System, convened by the International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and the World Economic Forum, produced a 
report that listed 24 different policy options.11 Many other suggestions can be found in the 
literature, ranging from options that are ‘general’ to others that focus on specific issues at the 
intersection of trade and climate (e.g. border carbon adjustments (BCAs), energy subsidies, 
climate-friendly technologies).12 However, in many cases, these options are only briefly 
discussed, and the existing literature does not offer a systematic assessment of their feasibility.  
The importance of analysing options in the light of real-world constraints is underscored 
by geopolitical developments. Suggestions to address climate change through the WTO already 
faced an uphill battle in the context of broader disagreements on the future of the Doha Round 
(which did not explicitly include a mandate to address climate change).13 However, there are 
more fundamental challenges to the WTO, such as increasing protectionism in the form of 
tariffs imposed unilaterally by the United States, followed by retaliatory measures by US 
trading partners;14 and ongoing uncertainty about Appellate Body judges’ appointments.15 
These may also challenge the feasibility of any changes oriented to climate policy. 
This article systematically discusses policy options for trade and climate policymakers. 
Based on a literature review and our own understanding, and in light of interviews with 26 
experts (listed in Annex 2), we have identified 22 options for further analysis. These include 
‘general options’ addressing the link between trade and climate change, as well as options 
                                                 
 
9 For a list of recent disputes see   Susanne Droege, Harro van Asselt, Kasturi Das & Michael Mehling, The Trade 
System and Climate Action: Ways Forward under the Paris Agreement, CLIMATE STRATEGIES (2016) at 52. 
10 Harro van Asselt, Climate Change and Trade Policy Interaction: Implications of Regionalism (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Trade and Environment Working Papers No. 2017/03, 2017). 
11 James Bacchus, Global Rules for Mutually Supportive and Reinforcing Trade and Climate Regimes, THE E15 
INITIATIVE, ICTSD AND WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2016). 
12 For a review, see Susanne Droege, Harro van Asselt, Kasturi Das & Michael Mehling, supra note 10.  
13 The disagreements are captured by World Trade Organization, Nairobi Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(15)/DEC (December 21, 2015), para. 30: ‘We recognize that many Members reaffirm the Doha 
Development Agenda, and the Declarations and Decisions adopted at Doha and at the Ministerial Conferences 
held since then, and reaffirm their full commitment to conclude the [Doha Development Agenda] on that basis. 
Other Members do not reaffirm the Doha mandates, as they believe new approaches are necessary to achieve 
meaningful outcomes in multilateral negotiations. Members have different views on how to address the 
negotiations. We acknowledge the strong legal structure of this Organization.’ 
14 See, e.g., D. Rushe, China Retaliates Against Trump’s $50bn in Tariffs, Escalating Possibility of Trade War, 
THE GUARDIAN, June 15, 2018. 
15 US Continues to Block Appointment of New AB Members, TWN INFO SERVICE ON WTO AND TRADE ISSUES, 
April 3, 2018 <https://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2018/ti180401.htm>. 
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specifically related to border carbon adjustments (BCAs) and fossil fuel subsidies. Each of the 
proposals is analysed with a focus on their political feasibility in the short term.16 In addition, 
where possible, we examine factors that may increase the utility and desirability of options, 
including their potential for reducing legal uncertainty.  
The article is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of the trade and 
climate policy regime to set the context.  Section III offers a detailed discussion of each of the 
22 proposed options, with a focus on their political feasibility in the short term. Section 4 
discusses and summarises the key findings, and offers some recommendations for trade and 
climate policymakers. 
 
II. THE CLIMATE AND TRADE REGIMES: AN OVERVIEW 
 
A. The Climate Regime 
 
The UNFCCC was adopted in 1992 at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development. 
With 196 parties, it has nearly universal participation. It sets out the main objective of the 
climate regime as “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.17 However, 
the Convention did not specify the legal obligations to achieve this objective. In 1995, parties 
started negotiating a protocol to stipulate mitigation targets for developed countries. This led to 
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which now has 192 parties. The Protocol requires 
industrialized countries to collectively reduce average greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% 
during 2008-2012 (i.e. the first commitment period), compared to 1990 levels. As an 
innovation, it introduced several market-based instruments (“flexible mechanisms”) to allow 
for cost-effective mitigation. While developing countries have signed and ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol they do not have any concrete obligations to reduce their emissions. With the 2012 
Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, parties agreed on a new commitment period for 2013-
2020. However, the amendment has yet to enter into force. 
Throughout the history of the climate regime, a recurring question has been who should 
take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and how the effort to address climate change 
should be shared. The UNFCCC establishes the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capacities, which was initially translated into a bifurcated 
division of Annex I (developed countries) and non-Annex I countries (developing countries). 
This approach was also followed in the Kyoto Protocol, which only required Annex I countries 
to mitigate emissions. As the pressure to broaden participation of countries – particularly major 
emerging economies such as China, which surpassed the United States as the world’s largest 
emitter in the late 2000s – in mitigation efforts rose fast, parties launched negotiations on a new 
climate treaty under the UNFCCC with the Bali Road Map in 2007. The purpose of a new 
agreement was to establish a genuinely global effort for long-term climate policy. After the 15th 
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen 2009 did not succeed in adopting a 
new global agreement, it took another six years of negotiations to find a consensus in Paris at 
COP21. 
The Paris Agreement was adopted by the 197 parties to the UNFCCC on 12 December 
2015. The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016, i.e. thirty days after the 
                                                 
 
16 Defined in this article as five years or less. 
17 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
U.N. Doc.  FCCC/INFORMAL/84 (1992) <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>. 
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date on which the threshold for the entry into force was achieved which required at least 55 
Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55% of the total global 
greenhouse gas emissions to deposit their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession with the Depositary. To date, out of 197 UNFCCC parties 180 have ratified the 
Agreement.18 
The purpose of the Paris Agreement is threefold: (1) to limit the global average 
temperature increase to “well below” 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and “to 
pursue efforts” to achieve 1.5 degrees Celsius; (2) to enhance the ability to adapt to climate 
change, to increase the resilience and to establish low-greenhouse gas development; (3) to make 
financial flows consistent with a low emissions pathway and climate resilient development. 
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, its predecessor, the core obligations under the Paris Agreement 
apply universally to all UNFCCC parties, and not just developed country parties.19 The Paris 
Agreement requires all parties to prepare and communicate nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs) which will have to be reviewed and updated every five years, with each new NDC 
required to be more ambitious than the previous one. The Agreement further specifies actions 
in the area of adaptation, as well as obligations related to the “means of implementation” (i.e. 
financial, technological, and capacity-building support). Although the contents of NDCs are up 
to parties, the Agreement puts in place several mechanisms to review implementation and 
progress made, including a transparency framework to review implementation of the NDCs, a 
mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance, and a five-yearly global 
stocktake to review collective progress. 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol both include explicit references to trade policy 
concerns. The language used is partly identical to that found in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT; see below),20 aiming at preventing protectionist applications of 
climate policy measures. The Paris Agreement, by contrast, does not contain any references to 
trade, due mainly to diverging positions of developed and developing countries. Following the 
Bali Action Plan in 2007, proposals by developing countries surfaced to include text in an 
international agreement that would prohibit developed countries from using unilateral trade 
measures on climate grounds. However, such proposals were usually accompanied by counter-
proposals by developed countries to include no text on the issue at all.21 
To offer institutional space for discussing such critical issues, parties created a forum 
on the impact of the implementation of response measures in 2010.22 As the Paris Agreement 
does not give guidance on trade and climate change, the forum is the primary institutional space 
for ongoing discussions on trade-related concerns in the context of the UNFCCC.23 The work 
                                                 
 
18 See <https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification> 
19 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 1.  
20 Article 3.5 of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 18, states that climate policy 
measures should not “constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade”. 
21 Harro van Asselt, The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance: Consequences and Management of Regime 
Interactions (2014). Also see N. Chan, The ‘New’ Impacts of the Implementation of Climate Change Response 
Measures, 25/2 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 228 (2016). 
22 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth 
session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010, Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, U. N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 -
Decision 1/CP.16 (March 15, 2011), paras. 88-94  <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf> 
23 See R. Bodle, L. Donat, L and M. Duwe, The Paris Agreement: Analysis, Assessment and Outlook, 
Umweltbundesamt, Background Paper for the Workshop “Beyond COP21: What Does Paris Mean for Future of 
Cimate Policy?” (2016) at 10 <http:// 
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of the forum needs to take into account “all relevant policy issues of concern”.24 Although the 
work programme of the forum does not directly tackle the climate-trade overlap, technical work 
on assessing the impacts of response measures suggests that trade-related impacts will be 
considered.25 In particular, the UNFCCC guidance on the impact assessment of response 
measures on developing countries mentions trade impacts from tariffs and border carbon 
adjustments (BCAs).26  
 
B. The World Trade Regime 
 
1. The WTO 
 
The origins of the world trade regime date back to 1947, when the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) was adopted. Nearly half a century later, the WTO was established, 
following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986-1994). The WTO, 
with its 164 members, is the institutional umbrella of a series of six sub-categories of 
agreements, including 14 agreements on trade in goods (e.g. GATT), and five other types of 
agreements, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement 
on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).27 
The key objective of the GATT was to promote the liberalisation of trade in goods for 
the benefit of its members. It sets out a number of trade principles, most notably that trade 
measures imposed by a member shall not discriminate between different trade partners (known 
as the most-favoured nation (MFN) obligation; Article I).28 Neither shall they discriminate 
against imported goods from other members vis-à-vis “like” domestic goods (the national 
treatment obligation; Article III).  
Although initial rounds of trade talks under the GATT were devoted to bringing down 
tariffs, later negotiation rounds (starting with the Tokyo Round, 1973-1979) broadened the 
scope to non-tariff barriers, such as import licensing, rules of origin, and investment measures. 
Over time, the multilateral trade regime came to cover new areas, such as services (through the 
GATS), intellectual property rights (through the TRIPS Agreement), technical standards 
(through the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, TBT), and subsidies (through the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, SCM). 
                                                 
 
ecologic.eu/sites/files/event/2016/ecologic_institute_2016_paris_agreement_assessment_0.pdf> Also see N. 
Chan, supra note 22.  
24 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first 
session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, Addendum, Part two: Action taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session, Forum and work programme on the impact of the 
implementation of response measures, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2, Decision 11/CP.21 (January 29, 
2016) < https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a02.pdf> 
25 For the work programme, see <http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/response_measures/items/7418.php>  
26 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Guidance to Assist Developing Country Parties to Assess the 
Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures, including Guidance on Modelling Tools, Guidance to assist 
developing country Parties to assess the impact of the implementation of response measures, including guidance 
on modelling tools, Technical paper by the secretariat, U.N. Doc. FCCC/TP/2016/4 (April 28, 2016) 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/tp/04.pdf> Section III, A 36 (e), at 8. 
27 World Trade Organization, Agreement on Establishing the WTO (1995) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf>. 
28 More specifically, a WTO member is obliged to provide to another WTO member treatment which is no less 
favorable than what it accords to any other country, irrespective of whether that country is a WTO member. 
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An important feature of the WTO is its strong dispute settlement mechanism, which 
extends the GATT’s practice.29 Under the integrated system of dispute settlement created 
alongside the WTO, the same dispute settlement rules apply to disputes under virtually all WTO 
agreements, subject to any special or additional rules in an individual agreement.30 The 
politically desirable outcome of a dispute is a resolution of the conflict through consultations, 
or, more generally, a solution mutually acceptable to the parties to the dispute. If this is not 
possible, the primary objective of the process is to withdraw the measure under contention, with 
compensation and retaliation being avenues of last resort.31 In contrast to the GATT’s 
diplomatic norms, which were criticized for lacking the “teeth” necessary to ensure compliance, 
the dispute settlement mechanism has been described as being “the most developed dispute 
settlement system in any existing treaty regime”.32 The system has been used intensively since 
the WTO came into being. The total of more than 500 disputes over the 20-year history of the 
WTO contrasts with the total of 300 disputes brought under the dispute settlement system of 
the GATT — the predecessor to the WTO — over a period of 47 years (1947-1994).33  
In 2001, a new round of trade talks, known as the Doha Development Round, was 
launched to expressly address issues of importance to developing countries. The Doha Round 
includes negotiations on the reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on 
environmental goods and services, and paragraph 31 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
acknowledges the relationship between existing WTO rules, and specific trade obligations set 
out in multilateral environmental agreements. The Doha Round negotiations use a “single 
undertaking” approach, where countries agree on all issues together. This prevents countries 
from cherry-picking issues, but makes consensus more challenging. The Doha Round largely 
came to a halt in 2008, and little progress has been made since then. Nevertheless, WTO 
members managed to reach agreement on the 2013 “Bali package” (covering trade facilitation, 
food security in developing countries, and cotton trade), and the 2015 “Nairobi package” 
(including an agreement to eliminate agricultural export subsidies). However, at the Nairobi 
Ministerial in 2015 important disagreements persisted among WTO members on the best way 
forward, leading to a stalemate in the trade talks.34Again Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference 
of 2017 failed to reach any new agreement.35  
In contrast with its apparently diminishing relevance in new rule-making for 
international trade, the WTO’s dispute settlement system is still a very strong institutional tool, 
and is used regularly by members. Given concerns about climate policy measures’ potential to 
violate WTO rules, dispute settlement takes a key role in providing legal clarity in cases of 
conflict. 
                                                 
 
29 World Trade Organization, supra note 28, at Art. III. 
30 The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding specifies the scope of jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, limiting it to the “covered agreements” listed in Article 1.1 World Trade Organization, Understanding 
On Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement Of Disputes (1995) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf>. 
31 D. T. Shedd, B. J. Murrill and J. M. Smith, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO): An 
Overview (Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, 2012) 
<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20088.pdf> 
32 D. Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System, 24/1 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 444 (2000). 
33 See <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep16_chap6_e.pdf>. 
34 Overview of Outcomes of WTO’s 10th Ministerial in Nairobi, 5 BRIDGES DAILY UPDATES, 2015, 
<http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/bridges-daily-update-5-overview-of-outcomes-of-
wto%E2%80%99s-10th-ministerial-in> 
35 <https://in.reuters.com/article/trade-wto/wto-meeting-ends-in-discord-ministers-urge-smaller-scale-trade-talks-
idINKBN1E71J1> 
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By contrast, the number of RTAs has risen sharply. RTAs, of which mega-regional 
agreements are a sub-category, have to be notified to the WTO in accordance with Article XXIV 
GATT. In addition, under the WTO umbrella, there are stand-alone plurilateral agreements 
including plurilateral agreements that extend concessions to all WTO members on an MFN 
basis once a critical mass is reached. The ongoing negotiations on a plurilateral Environmental 
Goods Agreement fall in the latter category, meaning that the benefits of the agreement will 
eventually be extended to all WTO Members once a critical mass is reached. 
Environmental concerns are acknowledged in the preamble to the 1995 Agreement 
Establishing the WTO, which contextualises the goals of the trade regime so as to “[allow] for 
the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development”.36 The WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) offers the 
institutional setting for elaborating the relationship between trade measures and environmental 
measures and for promoting sustainable development within the WTO. The CTE is open to all 
WTO Members, as well as observers from intergovernmental organisations, including the 
UNFCCC Secretariat. Although climate change hardly featured in WTO discussions until 2007, 
under the leadership of WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy (2005-2013) the organisation 
became actively involved in discussions on the climate and trade interface, notably leading to 
a joint report with the United Nations Environment Programme on the subject in 2009.37 Since 
the 1990s, the interface between trade and the environment – including, more recently, climate 
change – has come to the fore primarily through GATT/WTO case law, with a surge in WTO 
disputes in the area of climate and clean energy over the recent past. The implementation of the 
Paris Agreement with nationally driven climate action as a key approach, is likely to lead to 
further demand for discussing and clarifying how the regimes could interact in a productive 
way. 
 
2. Regional Trade Agreements 
 
Already during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, many GATT Parties turned to 
regional or bilateral trade agreements. The formation and strengthening of major trade blocs in 
the Americas (the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mercado Común del 
Sur (MERCOSUR)) and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s meant that other countries 
were incentivised to either join or to establish their own agreements.38 Against the backdrop of 
globalisation, RTAs were perceived to help enhance market access, promote foreign policy 
objectives and influence the policies of trading partners.39 As a result, the number of RTAs has 
increased significantly in the last two decades, leading to a “spaghetti bowl” of trade 
agreements.40 WTO members are obliged to notify the RTAs in which they participate. 
Interestingly, all of the WTO's Members have notified participation in one or more RTAs, with 
some of them being parties to 20 or more RTAs. As of 1 May 2018, the WTO had received 459 
notifications on RTAs from the Members, counting goods, services and accessions separately. 
Out of them 287 RTAs were in force.41 
                                                 
 
36 World Trade Organization, supra note 28.  
37 L. Tamiotti, R. Teh, V. Kulaçoğlu, et al., Trade and Climate Change: A Report by the United Nations 
Environment Programme and the World Trade Organization (World Trade Organization and United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2009). 
38 R. E. Baldwin, The Causes of Regionalism, 20/7 THE WORLD ECONOMY 865 (1997).  
39 T. Carpenter, A Historical Perspective on Regionalism, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM (P. Low and R. 
E. Baldwin eds., 2009). 
40 J. Bhagwati, Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 15/5 THE WORLD ECONOMY 535 (1992). 
41 See <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm#facts>. 
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In recent years, the discussion of regionalism in the trade context has taken a new turn 
with the emergence of the so-called “mega-regional” agreements.42 Negotiations on the EU-
Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) were concluded in August 
2014. On 21 September 2017 CETA entered into force provisionally.43  
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – involving Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam - was 
signed in February 2016. The goal of Barack Obama, who championed TPP, was that TPP 
would “write the rules for global trade”. But President Trump, on his first full day in office, 
signed an executive order withdrawing the United States from the TPP. As the 12 became 11, 
with the largest party leaving it was initially feared that the deal was dead. However, later 
remaining 11 members revived the talks resulting in the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP deal getting signed by the 11 countries on 
8 March 2018 in Santiago, Chile.44 The 11 members of CPTPP constitute 13.5% of the world 
economy.45 On 19 July 2018, Singapore became the third country to ratify the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), following Mexico and 
Japan. CPTPP will enter into force 60 days after at least six of its eleven signatories ratify it.46 
The negotiations for another mega-regional, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) got stalled, 
but is still not abandoned.47  
Another mega-regional under negotiation which is backed by China that left out the 
U.S. from the very beginning is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 
involving ten ASEAN members, along with China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and 
New Zealand. The 16-nation Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which 
will cover about half the world's population and a third of its GDP, has taken canter stage as 
Washington embarks on a unilateral, protectionist agenda. Broad agreement on what would be 
the world's biggest free trade deal is expected to be reached at a leaders' summit in Singapore 
in November, 2018.48  
The mega-regionals are not only important because of the parties involved – which 
include some of the world’s major nations – in terms of GDP and trade – but also because of 
their expansive scope, which covers not only market access, but also regulatory coherence. 
Given their scope and membership, the success or failure of mega-regionals may have influence 
on multilateral rule-making. Success means that future multilateral rules may be modelled after 
                                                 
 
42 Mega-regionals have been defined as “deep integration partnerships in the form of RTAs between countries or 
regions with a major share of world trade and [foreign direct investment] and in which two or more of the parties 
are in a paramount driver position, or serve as hubs, in global value chains”; WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, MEGA-
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: GAME-CHANGERS OR COSTLY DISTRACTIONS FOR THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM? (2014) AT 13, 
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_MegaRegionalTradeAgreements_Report_2
014.pdf>. 
43 <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta>. 
44See <https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/tpp-11/Pages/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-
tpp.aspx>. 
45 See <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/03/12/what-on-earth-is-the-cptpp>. 
46 See <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d800812e-6adf-4009-bc15-9816982c05b8>. 
47 See <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-29/trump-willing-to-reopen-ttip-amid-eu-u-s-trade-
spat-ross-says>. 
48 See <https://www.rappler.com/world/regions/asia-pacific/210934-deal-china-backed-rcep-trade-pact-likely-
november-says-singapore>. 
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the mega-regionals.49 Success may also lead to fewer RTAs, helping to clean up the ‘Spaghetti 
Bowl’.50 However, success is not guaranteed, as the various mega-regionals have come under 
significant scrutiny, partly triggered by civil society demands for transparency, partly by 
political opposition.  
Environmental provisions have become increasingly prevalent in RTAs. NAFTA set the 
stage by including a side-agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation, with other US RTAs following suit. The EU also started to incorporate 
environmental provisions in its RTAs with third countries since the mid-1990s. EU trade 
agreements with third countries are also linked to an increasing number of multilateral 
environmental agreements, whereas US trade agreements have become increasingly specific 
about the environmental action required, backed up by consultations and dispute-settlement 
procedures in the agreement.51 The trend of including environmental provisions is continuing 
also in the negotiation of mega-regionals.  
3. The Interactions Between the Regimes 
 
With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the climate regime has witnessed an evolution 
towards a universal regime, which requires mitigation efforts from all parties, but leaves open 
what kind of action parties undertake. The shift towards a more “bottom-up” approach to 
international climate policy holds potential implications for trade, as the resulting flexibility 
allows for a variety of measures that could have trade implications and for which a supportive 
trade policy setting would be helpful. 
The international trade regime has also undergone important changes in recent years. 
Although a well-established system of trade rules has been in place for over 20 years, and WTO 
members now include the world’s major trading nations, the single-undertaking approach that 
led to the WTO in the first place has created difficulties. Flanked by an increasing number of 
RTAs and, more recently, new mega-regional agreements, the relevance and dominance of the 
WTO in setting international trade rules has been challenged. The situation has been further 
worsened by President Trump’s repeated threat to pull the U.S. out of the WTO.52 The U.S. has 
also blocked appointment of WTO appellate body judges putting the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System into troubled water.  
The present scenario may offer both opportunities and risks for global climate 
protection, because there is a lack of guidance on the one hand, and space for new mutually 
supportive rules on the other. The two regimes have so far co-existed without creating severe 
frictions.53 However, this may not be the case in the future, with the recent emergence of a 
number of climate-related disputes. At the same time, the fact that both regimes find themselves 
at crossroads may also lead to new opportunities to create rules and procedures that lead to 
benefits for climate change, trade, and development. 
                                                 
 
49 R.E. Baldwin, Multilateralising 21st Century Regionalism, OECD Global Forum on Trade (2014), 
<https://www.oecd.org/tad/events/OECD-gft-2014-multilateralising-21st-century-regionalism-baldwin-
paper.pdf>. 
50 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 43, at 26. 
51 S. Jinnah and E. Morgera, Environmental Provisions in American and EU Free Trade Agreements. A 
Preliminary Comparison and Research Agenda, 22/3 REV. EUR., COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 324 (2013). 
 
52 See <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45364150>. 
53 van Asselt, supra note 22 at 166. Also see R. Eckersley, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE 
CLIMATE AND TRADE REGIMES IN CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICIES IN A POST-2012 WORLD (B. Simmons, H. van 
Asselt, F. Zelli et al. eds., 2009). 
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III. ASSESSING THE OPTIONS 
This section discusses a list of 22 policy options to make the international trading system more 
supportive of climate action in line with the Paris Agreement.  
Our aim was to identify a set of policy options and undertake a systematic analysis of 
each of them from the point of view of their political feasibility. The options analysed and 
presented in this article belong to the following five categories: 
(1) Legal changes at the WTO options that focus on increasing the trade system’s 
supportiveness of climate action in general, rather than in the context of any specific 
issue; 
(2) Procedural changes and practices within and between the WTO- and the UNFCCC-
systems;  
(3) Actions under Plurilateral and Regional Trade Agreements; 
(4) options that focus specifically on implementation of border carbon adjustments; 
and 
(5) options that deal specifically with the phase-out and reform of fossil fuel subsidies. 
The first three categories look into proposals ‘in general’, rather than in the context of 
any specific issue, the subsequent two categories focus on the more specific issue areas of 
border carbon adjustments (Category 4) and fossil fuel subsidies (Category 5). 
In this section we briefly present and explain each of the 22 options. We have analysed 
and assessed the political feasibility in the light of (a) existing academic and policy literature; 
(b) official documents; (c) insights obtained in expert interviews (see Annex 2 for the list of 
interviewees); and finally (4) our own understanding. As such, we are solely responsible for the 
views, perspectives, and judgements presented in this article.  
 
A. Category 1: Legal Changes at the WTO 
 
Recent years have seen a surge in WTO disputes targeting domestic support and policy 
measures related to clean energy, leading to potential contradictions between the trade regime 
and climate action.54 One argument in favour of reforming WTO rules is that the case-by-case 
nature of WTO disputes does not provide sufficient structural legal guidance for the 
implementation of NDCs under the Paris Agreement, and leaves the settlement of climate-
related disputes to a body that is guided first and foremost by the rules of the multilateral trading 
system.55 If the demand for legal guidance increases, there are several ways in which WTO 
Members could provide it.56 In this regard, we consider a set of four ‘general’ policy options 
relating to changes in the WTO law.57 
 
Option 1A: Amending the text of the WTO Agreements to explicitly accommodate climate 
change measures or measures taken pursuant to the Paris Agreement 
The procedures to be followed for amending WTO Agreements can be found in Article X of 
the Agreement Establishing the WTO. According to this provision, the Ministerial Conference 
(MC) receives a proposal for an amendment by a WTO Member or one of the three specialised 
                                                 
 
54 Susanne Droege, Harro van Asselt, Kasturi Das & Michael Mehling, The Trade System and Climate Action: 
Ways Forward under the Paris Agreement, 13 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 195 (2017), at 52-55. 
55 Bacchus, supra note 12, at 13–14. 
56 Droege et al., supra note 55, at 27. 
57 Drawing primarily on Susanne Droege, et al. supra note 55. 
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Councils (Goods, Services, TRIPS). The MC is given a period of at least 90 days to try and 
reach consensus on the proposal. If consensus is not reached by the stipulated timeframe, the 
MC may decide by a two-thirds majority of Members to submit the proposal to Members for 
acceptance in accordance with their ratification procedures. The amendment, in general, takes 
effect after two thirds of Members have ratified it. For certain specified provisions, amendments 
take effect only upon acceptance by all Members. 
An amendment, if ratified by all WTO Members, can permanently alter their WTO 
obligations. An amendment could reduce the legal uncertainty confronting climate policies and 
measures deriving from the case-by-case nature of the WTO dispute settlement system. With 
an amendment clarifying the legal scope of trade-related climate measures, the frequency of 
disputes in this area is likely to reduce. This would ease the burden on the WTO dispute 
settlement system, which is already overburdened, while facilitating normative coherence 
between the trade and climate regimes.58 
The flipside, however, is that the modus operandi of an amendment in WTO law is 
highly complex (as detailed above), and any amendment will likely take long to come into 
force.59 Submitting an amendment itself needs consensus, and depending on the content (and 
the specific treaty provision it applies to), it will require the acceptance of at least two-thirds of 
the Members, and in some cases even of all Members to come into effect. Another major 
challenge is that WTO amendments, in general,60 are binding only on those Members that ratify 
them, and not on all Members. For any WTO Member that does not accept an amendment, the 
un-amended WTO rules would still apply, and that Member could bring and win a dispute 
against any climate change or renewable energy measure that violates the un-amended rules.61 
Not surprisingly, amendments have hardly been used in WTO practice so far.62 Negotiating an 
amendment for climate purposes will be highly challenging. Even if the procedural barriers to 
its adoption could be overcome, it would still be difficult to reach agreement on its formulation. 
For these reasons, the political feasibility of an amendment is very low in the short 
term.63 In addition, adopting an amendment on a topic that is still controversial at a time when 
overall decision-making in the WTO is proving to be challenging will likely be difficult.  
 
Option 1B: Adopting a waiver relieving WTO Members from legal obligations under 
the WTO Agreements 
A second legal window available within the WTO is the ‘waiver’ provision of Article IX.3 of 
the Agreement Establishing the WTO. Request for waivers is to be submitted to the relevant 
sectoral Councils (Goods, Services, TRIPS). The request has to specify the proposed measure, 
underlying policy objectives, and explain as to what prevents application of GATT-compliant 
measures. After up to 90 days the relevant Council has to submit a report to the MC or the 
General Council. Although the decision may be adopted by a three-fourths majority, in practice 
                                                 
 
58 H. van Asselt, F. Sindico, & M. A. Mehling, Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International 
Law, 30 LAW & POL’Y 423 (2008) at 440. 
59 The sole case of an amendment of WTO law (a compulsory licensing provision related to public health in the 
TRIPS Agreement) was adopted in 2005, but only came into effect in 2017. See 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm>. 
60 Only a few amendments that do not alter the rights and obligations of Members take effect for all Members. 
61 A. Porges and T. L. Brewer, Climate Change and a Renewable Energy Scale-up: Responding to Challenges 
Posed to the WTO, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2014), at 1. 
62 The only exception has been an amendment to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), see <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm>. 
63 Interviews 1–11. 
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waiver decisions are adopted by consensus. The decision granting a waiver may specify terms 
and conditions that the Member to whom the waiver is being granted must fulfil. Notably, 
waivers exceeding one year are subject to annual review wherein any extension, modification 
or termination may be decided by a simple majority. Waivers exceeding one year must undergo 
a review by the MC within one year since it is granted, and thereafter annually until the waiver 
terminates. In each such review, the MC is required to examine whether the exceptional 
circumstances justifying the waiver still exist and whether the terms and conditions attached to 
the waiver have been met. The MC, on the basis of the annual review, may extend, modify or 
terminate the waiver by a simple majority. 
A waiver enables WTO Members to lawfully take measures which, in the absence of 
the waiver, might be judged as violating WTO law.64 However, a waiver can be used only under 
‘exceptional circumstances’ and for a limited period of time, as specified in the waiver decision. 
Waivers are also subject to well-specified terms and conditions. 
Waivers have been extensively used by the WTO.65 Notable among them are the 
Kimberley Waiver on ‘blood diamonds’, which waived certain provisions of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to allow the participants to the Kimberley Process to 
ban trade with non-participants in rough diamonds.66 Another example is the TRIPS Waiver on 
compulsory licensing, which waived certain TRIPS requirements regarding compulsory 
licensing for facilitating access to medicines to countries lacking manufacturing capacity.67 
Incidentally, both these waivers were granted in 2003. 
The granting of a waiver is a simple and flexible method for relieving a WTO Member 
or all WTO Members from a particular WTO obligation. The waiver decision becomes legally 
effective as soon as it is adopted by the MC. Feichtner points out that a waiver allows for a 
general modification of WTO rules in the direction of non-economic interests. More precisely, 
it restricts the WTO’s jurisdiction in favour of ‘other international legal regimes which may 
have greater competence and legitimacy than the WTO to deal with certain issues’,68 and which 
actually have a legal mandate that affects trade.69 Climate change-related interests may fit the 
bill. 
However, waivers also have several disadvantages. For instance, they can work as a 
defence against existing obligations but cannot create additional obligations to those set out in 
the WTO Agreements. All waivers are temporary, and, in general, have a specific expiration 
date.70 Waivers exceeding one year are subject to annual review during which they can be 
extended, modified or terminated by a simple majority. As waivers cannot provide a permanent 
and definitive reduction of a WTO obligation, this may result in an endless, contentious debate 
                                                 
 
64 James Bacchus, The Case for a WTO Climate Waiver, CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION 
(2017), at 22. 
65 For a list of waivers granted by General Council and by the Ministerial Conference between 1995 and 2015, see 
General Council, Waivers 1995 – 2015: Note by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/718 (June 27, 2016). 
66 This was to clarify that trade actions taken against non-participant WTO Members to help suppress trade in 
conflict or blood diamonds under the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds are justified 
under the GATT (General Council, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough 
Diamonds, Decision of 15 May 2003, WTO Doc. WT/L/518 (May 27, 2003). 
67 General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, Decision of 30 August 2003, WTO Doc. WT/L/540 (September 2, 2003).  
68 I. Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO, Opening the WTO for Political Debate on the Reconciliation of 
Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 615 (2009) at 645. 
69 Feichtner, supra note 69 at 618. 
70 The only exception is the waiver on TRIPS and public health, which states that it will terminate for each Member 
only on the date when an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions enters into effect for that 
Member (General Council, supra note 68). 
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every year at the time of review. As opposed to the temporary character of a waiver, climate 
change poses long-term challenges, and the policies required to reduce emissions need to be 
long-term too. The built-in uncertainty of the waiver approach may therefore not provide the 
much-needed predictability to climate policy makers and other stakeholders.  
In terms of political feasibility, the temporary nature of a waiver may render it more 
appealing. However, much like an amendment, requesting and obtaining a waiver involves a 
political process.71 Furthermore, given that the beneficiaries of a waiver for climate policies 
may primarily be developed countries, concerns about disguised protectionism may also arise.72 
In the short term, the feasibility of a climate waiver appears low,73 but its temporary nature may 
make it emerge as a more likely option in the medium to long term. 
 
Option 1C: Adopting an authoritative interpretation of WTO provisions 
A third option is to adopt an authoritative interpretation of certain provisions of the WTO 
Agreements. Through an authoritative interpretation, WTO Members could, for instance, agree 
that certain measures pursuing climate change objectives or measures implementing a climate 
change agreement (e.g. the Paris Agreement) are consistent with certain provisions of the WTO 
Agreements.74 
Article IX.2 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO confers on the MC and the General 
Council the exclusive authority to adopt such interpretations.75 Recommendation for an 
authoritative interpretation is to be submitted to the MC by the body overseeing the functioning 
of the agreement concerned, namely the (a) Council for Trade in Goods for goods-related 
agreements; (b) Council for Trade in Services for the General Agreement on Trade in Services; 
and (c) Council for TRIPS for the TRIPS Agreement. The decision is to be adopted by the MC 
by a three-fourths majority. 
There are many provisions in the WTO Agreements that are open to interpretation and 
this option could help increase legal clarity in such cases. However, unlike an amendment, an 
authoritative interpretation cannot make new law or impose new obligations. It is only meant 
to clarify the meaning of existing provisions, and not to modify their content.76 This option, 
therefore, cannot offer the same extent of legal certainty as amendments.77 Nonetheless, a 
decision that removes the legal uncertainty surrounding a particular provision can have effects 
comparable to those of a clarifying amendment.78 Importantly, an authoritative interpretation is 
immediately binding on all WTO Members and could also be used to modify or reverse 
                                                 
 
71 See, for instance, Porges and Brewer, supra note 62, at 5–6. 
72 Interview 3. 
73 Interviews 1–11. 
74 M. Buck & R. Verheyen, International Trade Law and Climate Change – A Positive Way Forward, FES-
ANALYSE ÖKOLOGISCHE MARKTWIRTSCHAFT, FRIEDRICH-EBERT STIFTUNG (2001), at 33. 
75 C.D. Ehlermann & L. Ehring, The Authoritative Interpretation under Article IX. 2 of the Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization: Current Law, Practice and Possible Improvements, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 803, 
(2005) AT 806. 
76 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (adopted Sept. 25, 1997), para. 383. 
77Notably, the Agreement Establishing the WTO clearly states that Article IX.2 ‘shall not be used in a manner that 
would undermine the amendment provisions in Article X’. see World Trade Organization, supra note 28. 
78 ADVISORY CENTRE ON WTO LAW (ACWL), BACKGROUND PAPER FOR ACWL MEMBERS AND LDCS, GIVING 
LEGAL EFFECT TO THE RESULTS OF THE DOHA ROUND: AN ANALYSIS OF THE METHODS OF CHANGING WTO LAW 
(2006) AT 26. 
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interpretations of the Appellate Body,79 and could even (potentially) affect outcomes in WTO 
dispute settlement.80 
The WTO Members have hardly made any attempt to make use of the authoritative 
interpretation window.81 In one occasion, in 1999, the European Communities attempted to 
obtain an interpretation in order to resolve the so-called ‘sequencing’ issue regarding the 
relationship between Article 21.5 and 22.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) on 
compliance measures.82 Another attempt by the EU was the EU Parliament’s resolution urging 
an authoritative interpretation on the ‘like product’ doctrine.83 
Compared to an amendment or a waiver, an authoritative interpretation appears to be a 
more limited intervention in the regime. It is also simpler and procedurally more straightforward 
because it concerns the interpretation of existing text, rather than the creation of new text.84 
Hence, for clarifying certain grey areas in WTO law for climate change purposes, authoritative 
interpretations may be relatively more feasible, at least compared to an amendment or a waiver, 
in the medium term. However, like other legal changes, it seems unlikely that it could be 
adopted in the short term.85 The political feasibility will likely depend also on which particular 
provision of WTO law is in question. 
 
Option 1D: A temporary ‘peace clause’ for trade-related climate measures 
Another option to create some legal breathing space for climate action by WTO Members is to 
agree on a ‘peace clause’ specifying that the Members will not take any legal action through 
the WTO dispute settlement system on the issue covered by the clause. A peace clause or a 
‘moratorium’ could be time-limited and conditional.86 It could permit temporary breaches of 
                                                 
 
79 See ACWL, supra note 79, at 25. As clarified by the WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures 
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted April 24, 2012), 
para 262, a decision adopted by Members may qualify as a ‘subsequent agreement between the parties’ regarding 
the interpretation of a covered WTO agreement or the application of its provisions if:(i) the decision is adopted 
subsequent to the relevant covered agreement; and (ii) the terms and content of the decision express an agreement 
between Members on the interpretation or application of a provision of WTO law. Such a subsequent agreement 
would be taken into account in the interpretation of the WTO Agreements, pursuant to Article 31.3(a) of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which with respect to interpretation of treaty provisions states: ‘There 
shall be taken into account, together with the context:(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions[.]’ 
80 Porges and Brewer, supra note 62, at 1. 
81 WILMERHALE (2005), Decision Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World 
Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade? September 
23, <https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/publications/decision-making-in-the-world-trade-organization-is-
the-consensus-practice-of-the-world-trade-organization-adequate-for-making-revising-and-implementing-rules-
on-international-trade-autumn-2005> 
82 See General Council, Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization – Communication from the European Communities, WTO 
Doc. WT/GC/W/133 (January 25, 1999), with advice from the International Monetary Fund on balance of 
payments measures. Also see General Council, Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to Article 
IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization – Communication from the 
European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/143 (February 5, 1999), with advice from the World Intellectual 
Property Organization on the Berne Convention. 
83 Resolution on Environmental, Health and Consumer Protection Aspects of World Trade,  EUR. PARL. DOC. 
Official Journal C152/78 (1998), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A51998IP0125> 
84 Interview 6. 
85 Interviews 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. 
86 Kasturi Das & Kaushik Ranjan Bandyopadhyay, Climate Change and Clean Energy in the 2030 Agenda: What 
Role for the Trade System? INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2016),  AT vi. 
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WTO rules by Members, either for some or for all areas of climate change policy.87 Given the 
risks and unpredictability of litigation as a strategy, a moratorium on dispute settlement in the 
area of clean energy has been suggested.88 Such a moratorium could cover some or all areas of 
climate change mitigation based on an agreement with trading partners, including those whose 
trade could be impacted by such measures. A more concrete proposal is to require WTO 
Members to wait at least three years before challenging through WTO dispute settlement 
national climate measures or countermeasures that restrict trade or otherwise have trade 
effects.89 
A temporary peace clause may be adopted through a decision by WTO Members as 
specified in Article IX.1 of the Agreement establishing the WTO. Such decisions may be agreed 
upon by the WTO Members in the MCs or at the General Council. Attempt shall first be made 
to arrive at any such Decision through consensus. In case a decision cannot be reached by 
consensus, it can be made through a majority vote. 
There are some precedents for a peace clause or a moratorium, for instance in the areas 
of intellectual property rights90 and agriculture.91 Another precedent is the ‘interim peace 
clause’ agreed through a Ministerial Decision92 during the WTO Ministerial Conference held 
in Bali in 2011.93 
Adopting a peace clause through a ministerial decision appears to be relatively more 
straightforward than the three options discussed above (Options 1A to 1C), but would still 
require an effort to find consensus among Members. 
As for the legal implications, it is unclear whether this option would secure full 
protection against disputes. To provide legal certainty, a decision on a peace clause or a 
moratorium would have to clearly state the intention not to challenge certain measures, and 
clearly describe the measures not to be challenged. However, it remains debatable whether the 
doctrine of estoppel,94 which is well recognised in general international law, could be invoked 
if a WTO Member challenged a trade-related climate measure of another Member at the WTO 
dispute settlement system after agreeing to abide by a peace clause.95 According to some 
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commentators, if a WTO Member were to bring a claim before the WTO dispute settlement 
system in clear violation of its commitment not to do so under the peace clause, this would be 
tantamount to a violation of the obligation of ‘good faith’ (enshrined in Article 3.10 of the WTO 
DSU), and the claim would likely be found inadmissible.96It needs to be underscored that a 
peace clause is intended to provide temporary breathing space only; it is a mechanism to buy 
time97 until a permanent solution is found to create legal clarity. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to define what constitutes a ‘climate measure’ or ‘climate 
action’ to make sure that a peace clause indeed prevents disputes over them. Thus, a major 
challenge with a peace clause is to get the scope right. An ill-formulated peace clause could end 
up offering WTO Members a carte blanche, creating a perverse incentive for introducing 
protectionist or otherwise trade-restrictive climate policy measures.98 
Given these challenges, and the current political climate surrounding the WTO, 
adopting a peace clause for climate purposes appears to be very unlikely in the short term. 
 
B. Category 2: Procedural Changes in Institutions and Practices 
 
Given the significant hurdles confronting any legal changes at the WTO in the near term, 
alternative avenues to enhance the trade system’s contribution to the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement could focus on procedural changes in trade- as well as climate-related 
institutions and practices.99 This section delves into three such options.  
 
Option 2A: Ensuring technical expertise on climate change in WTO dispute settlement panels 
One option is to ensure that the composition of WTO dispute settlement panels reflects the 
necessary technical expertise to cover climate-related matters.100 This will not require any legal 
change, since Article 13 and Appendix 4 of the WTO DSU and several other WTO Agreements 
already provide the dispute settlement panels with sufficient discretion to seek information and 
technical advice from experts, provided the relevant rules and procedures are followed.  
If a WTO panel wishes to appoint external experts, it can either appoint individual 
experts, or it can set up a so-called ‘expert review group’ under Article 13.2 of the DSU, for 
which the procedures enshrined in Appendix 4 of the DSU apply. It is for the panel to decide 
whether it will appoint experts. A panel may appoint experts at its own initiative, or upon 
request by a party to a dispute. If a party to a dispute requests the appointment of an expert, the 
panel, however, is under no legal obligation to accept such a request. 
There is no provision as such that clearly states how experts are to be appointed. In the 
past, experts have been appointed by the parties and the panel together. There have also been 
instances in which the panel has appointed experts based on a list of names received from the 
relevant international organisation.101Given that in the past panels have requested expert advice 
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from other international organisations,102 a panel could conceivably seek advice from the 
UNFCCC Secretariat as well. 
According to Pauwelyn, even if expert advice is advisory only, it will be difficult for a 
panel to overrule a consensus position expressed by the experts.103 Hence, expert advice could 
presumably play an important role in climate-related WTO disputes. 
In theory, the inclusion of climate change expertise in WTO dispute panels could be 
accomplished under existing WTO rules. But in practice this could be made more challenging 
by the ongoing impasse regarding the WTO’s Appellate Body: The Trump Administration in 
the United States is staunchly opposed to the appointment of new Appellate Body judges, 
arguing that the forum has consistently over-stepped its remit with aggressive interpretations of 
existing rules.104 If the impasse continues, the body runs the risk of getting paralysed by 
December 2019 because it will not have the three judges required to sign off on rulings. 
However, given that the Appellate Body impasse has not stopped WTO Members from 
initiating new disputes, or halted the ongoing work of the WTO dispute panels, we believe this 
option is still worth considering for ongoing105 and future climate-related disputes. If WTO 
Members manage to find a way out of the current Appellate Body impasse, this option will 
arguably become more feasible. Moreover, given that the complexities of climate-related WTO 
disputes will likely increase in the future, WTO Members may realise more and more the need 
to include climate expertise in dispute panels.106 Overall, this option seems to have a reasonably 
high potential107 in the short term. 
Option 2B: Including mandatory climate-related impact assessments in the WTO’s 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
Another WTO window worth exploring is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), the 
WTO’s central surveillance system of national trade policies.108 There have been repeated calls 
for the TPRM to be opened up to environmental (and social) interests. It has been suggested, 
for instance, that the Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) might survey not only the impact of national 
environmental requirements on free trade, but also the impact of international trade agreements 
on national ecological interests and policies.109 Similar arguments may hold for climate change. 
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Interestingly, according to the annual Environmental Database (EDB) published by the 
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE),110 there are many instances in which TPRs 
have covered environment-related and, more specifically, climate policy-related information. 
For example, the EDB published in October 2017 shows that among the 20 countries whose 
TPRs were carried out in 2015, 19 had included environment-related information. 
However, any inclusion of climate-related information still only occurs on an individual 
and voluntary basis. Also, at present these are mostly at the level of providing information, 
somewhat complementing the notification provisions of the WTO.111 Indeed, the TPRM has 
historically tended to be a dormant peer-review assessment mechanism, largely used only for 
information purposes. Bacchus, however, proposes to strengthen the TPRM to include a 
‘required’ impact assessment of relevant domestic measures on climate change, and also on 
efforts to address climate change.112 
While enhanced transparency may help build trust among WTO Members, the TPRM 
cannot serve as a basis for enforcement, dispute settlement, or as a means to seek new 
commitments from Members.113 However, using the TPRM as a first level (baseline) of 
information in the context of dispute settlement (especially for climate change measures, which 
can be complex and vastly different across countries) could be explored.114 The TPRM could 
also help in providing a standardised approach for measuring different climate change responses 
across countries.115 This could conceivably enhance comparability of climate measures 
undertaken by WTO Members. If the TPRM leads to information on whether or not a country’s 
actions are in line with the Paris Agreement, that may potentially lead to fewer challenges and 
reduce the burden on the already overcharged WTO dispute settlement system.116 
However, at present there is no legal basis for any explicit mandatory inclusion of 
climate change aspects in the TPRM. Any provision mandating it will require an amendment 
of Annex 3 on the TPRM, subject to approval by the Ministerial Conference.117 This brings us 
back to the difficulties of implementing WTO amendments discussed under Option 1A.  
While a mandatory inclusion of climate-related impact assessment in the TPRs thus 
appears to be unlikely in the short term,118 voluntary inclusion of such information is possible 
and already happening, as evinced by the aforementioned EDB statistics as well as the case of 
fossil fuel subsidies119 (see Option 5B later). Broadly, the WTO membership appears to be 
increasingly open to environmental or climate-related queries and revelations, albeit on a 
voluntarily basis. The openness of WTO membership may increase even further over time as 
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trade issues become increasingly intertwined with climate change issues (as well as the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)).120  
 
Option 2C: Enhancing coordination between the WTO and UNFCCC through more intensive 
use of existing forums 
Another option of procedural reforms could be to enhance coordinated efforts, in a systematic 
way, between the WTO and the UNFCCC for the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This 
could be achieved through more effective use of the existing forums, such as the WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE)121 and the UNFCCC’s ‘Improved Forum on the 
Impact of the Implementation of the Response Measures’.122 This could strengthen the 
knowledge base of both institutions and improve the mutual understanding of trade and climate 
regimes, especially as regards the respective objectives, principles and legal obligations.123  
 
Notably, some cooperation is already taking place between the WTO and the UNFCCC. For 
instance, the UNFCCC representatives participate in meetings of the regular WTO CTE and as 
ad-hoc observer to the CTE in Special Session.124 On the other hand, the WTO secretariat 
representatives attend UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) meetings.125 However, there still 
is much scope to increase engagement. With that aim in view the existing scope available to 
each forum could be used more intensively, and/or the respective mandates could be broadened 
to create greater room for discussion of the trade impacts of climate policies or the climate 
impacts of trade policies. 
There have been instances where issues first raised in the CTE eventually evolved into 
fully-fledged negotiations, such as fisheries subsidies.126 However, climate change is not 
explicitly part of the WTO’s work programme under the CTE (or elsewhere). The CTE has a 
wider mandate on the environment.127 The Work Programme of the CTE under the Doha Round 
and beyond, however, already includes issues such as the relationship between WTO rules and 
trade measures contained in multilateral environmental agreements and between their dispute 
settlement mechanisms, among others. Within this remit, several issues relating to climate 
change have been discussed in the CTE in the past.128 
As for institutional dialogue, the UNFCCC Secretariat already has an observer status 
within the CTE. The UNFCCC is often also invited in the Special Sessions of the CTE on an 
ad-hoc basis. However, there still is much scope to increase engagement with the UNFCCC 
Secretariat and, more generally, debating trade-related climate policies.  
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As for the UNFCCC, the ‘improved forum on the impact of the implementation of 
response measures’129 is the primary institutional space for ongoing discussions on trade-related 
matters.130 Although the work programme of the forum does not directly tackle the climate-
trade overlap, technical work on assessing the impacts of response measures suggests that trade-
related impacts will be considered. In particular, the UNFCCC guidance on the impact 
assessment of response measures in developing countries mentions trade impacts from tariffs 
and BCAs.131 The submissions to the UNFCCC Secretariat by the G77 and China132 group have 
also covered trade aspects, including impacts of unilateral trade measures (which could include 
BCAs).133 Under the improved forum, technical work on measuring and identifying the trade 
impacts of climate policy measures has now begun,134 but the modalities for its work 
programme are still under negotiation.135 
Although some trade-relevant discussions over the years have taken place in the context 
of response measures, a systematic approach is still missing.136 There is for instance no 
systematic discussion of the trade impacts of parties’ NDCs.137 Moreover, while WTO 
representatives have participated in the UNFCCC meetings, there is no clear coordination with 
the work carried out by WTO bodies.138 Against this background, the forum could go a long 
way in coordinating work with the WTO.139 
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While coordinated actions by the WTO and the UNFCCC will not provide legal 
certainty, they could nonetheless help apply or interpret laws, and promote integration of 
climate concerns in trade matters, which may indirectly contribute to reducing legal uncertainty. 
Such efforts could also help scale down tension and foster more cooperative approaches while 
formulating climate policies in tandem with trade law. The forums could thus be used as a 
starting point for discussions of controversial issues at the trade-climate intersection. Once the 
ice is broken, this could eventually lead to more formal negotiations on reforms, including 
possible legal reforms. 
Coordination through more effective use of existing forums is a pragmatic approach. 
However, to date, not much has happened on this front. For instance, over the past two decades, 
the status of the CTE has not changed much in the way it approaches climate change.140 
Nonetheless, changes may be possible. Costa Rica, for instance, is in the process of forming a 
new group of WTO Members at the CTE on sustainable trade.141 Trade-related matters are also 
being discussed at the UNFCCC’s improved forum on implementation of response measures, 
with some UNFCCC Parties asking for more focused talks. Overall, therefore, this option seems 
to have a reasonably high potential142 in the short term. 
 
C. Category 3: Actions under Plurilateral and Regional Trade Agreements 
 
As multilateral initiatives and decisions to create room for climate change policies and measures 
have their own difficulties and challenges, particularly owing to the large number of WTO 
Members (164 at present), advancing climate change objectives among a smaller group of like-
minded countries is an avenue worth exploring – either through plurilateral initiatives or 
through regional trade agreements (RTAs). 
Plurilateral agreements can be created under the auspices of the WTO or outside of it. 
A plurilateral agreement under the WTO could be either: (a) ‘exclusive’, i.e. a stand-alone deal 
(e.g. the Government Procurement Agreement); or (b) ‘inclusive’, whereby 
benefits/concessions would be extended to all WTO Members on a most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) basis (e.g. Information Technology Agreement; and the Environmental Goods 
Agreement under negotiation).  
An ‘exclusive’ plurilateral agreement under the WTO would offer the Members more 
flexibility as to what to cover within it, but would require consensus by all WTO members, 
making it politically challenging. In an ‘exclusive’ agreement, only members would benefit 
from trade liberalisation under the deal. For an ‘inclusive’ plurilateral agreement under the 
WTO, a ‘critical mass’ of Members is generally regarded as preferable to ensure that the 
Members reap sufficient benefits. 143 
Examples of ‘inclusive’ deals are the Information Technology Agreement, and the 
Environmental Goods Agreement.  Such agreements can complement multilateral initiatives 
under the WTO and may potentially lead to multilateral rulemaking in future. 
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As for RTAs, several analysts have argued that they can potentially contribute to climate 
governance.144 Given that RTA negotiations involve only a handful of countries addressing a 
multitude of different issues, they allow for bargaining and the conclusion of new agreements. 
RTAs also offer opportunities for policy experimentation through which states can craft and 
test climate provisions at a limited scale with like-minded countries. Besides, RTAs are 
uniquely positioned to address various measures at the intersection of trade and climate change, 
such as the transfer of low-carbon technologies, emissions trading, BCAs and fossil fuel 
subsidies, to name a few.145 RTAs can further help in setting common rules for trade-related 
climate measures by aligning standards and regulations.146 Finally, climate measures agreed at 
the regional level may potentially be multilateralised147 at a later stage. 
This section considers three policy options in the plurilateral and regional arena: (i) 
intensifying efforts under plurilateral approaches, particularly focusing on the Environmental 
Goods Agreement (EGA); (ii) including climate-related provisions in prospective RTAs; and 
(iii) reviewing and renegotiating existing RTAs with a view to include climate change 
considerations. 
 
Option 3A: Intensifying efforts under plurilateral approaches, particularly the 
Environmental Goods Agreement  
Climate-friendly provisions could be included in new plurilateral trade agreements. Plurilaterals 
struck under the aegis of the WTO, particularly the ‘inclusive’ type of agreements, could offer 
scope for a group of like-minded WTO Members to move ahead and agree on common rules 
addressing certain areas at the intersection of trade and climate change. This would bypass the 
hurdles caused by the slow pace of decision-making under the WTO. 
Hufbauer and colleagues have proposed a plurilateral trade and climate code which 
would deal with a range of aspects at the intersection of climate and trade.148 The International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development has suggested a ‘Sustainable Energy Trade 
Agreement’ covering the liberalisation of climate-friendly goods and services.149 
A plurilateral initiative that has significant potential and has also made some concrete 
progress is the Environmental Goods Agreement, which is being negotiated under the aegis of 
the WTO as an ‘inclusive’ deal Although the WTO Doha Round mandate includes the 
liberalisation of trade in environmental goods and services, multilateral negotiations have long 
since stalled. The plurilateral EGA therefore offers an alternative route to advance the goals of 
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the Paris Agreement,150 as it can potentially help disseminate climate-related products and 
technologies by lowering tariffs on environmental goods. Given its ‘inclusive’ nature, once a 
‘critical mass’ is reached, all WTO members could eventually benefit from improved access to 
the markets of the EGA participants,151 
In 2012, the 21 members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) committed 
to reducing their applied tariffs to five per cent or less on a list of environmental goods152 by 
the end of 2015.153 Shortly thereafter, in 2014, 14 WTO Members launched negotiations on a 
plurilateral EGA, with three more members subsequently joining forces. This is being 
negotiated in line with WTO rules. The EGA builds on the APEC list of environmental goods. 
The latest list, released in August 2016 as part of the EGA negotiations, comprises goods from 
around 300 tariff lines, including several in the field of clean energy technology. The EGA and 
its benefits could eventually be extended on an MFN basis to all WTO Members, subject to the 
condition that WTO Members in the EGA represent a ‘critical mass’154 of global trade in 
environmental goods. However, efforts to reach a deal on the EGA came to a halt in December 
2016, when participants including the EU, the United States and China failed to reach a landing 
zone.155 
An inherent challenge of the EGA process is the lack of agreement on the definition of 
environmental goods.156 Many so-called ‘environmental’ goods have ‘dual’ or multiple uses,157 
raising questions on how appropriate it is to call them such. Another question is how to define 
the ‘environmentally preferable’ products.158 All this has led to lengthy and heated debates as 
to which goods should be listed for the EGA, as negotiations are following a list-based 
approach. 
Several suggestions have been made on extending the scope of the EGA. It has been 
recommended, for instance, that the list of goods under negotiation could cover goods and 
technologies for climate change adaptation, going beyond the current scope, which focuses on 
mitigation.159 Given its list-based approach, the EGA could have an in-built mechanism 
allowing to add new items and delete existing items. This would create room for updating the 
EGA’s list of goods in line with technological progress and the progressive commercialisation 
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of more climate-friendly goods.160 A major reason why the EGA in its present form is limited 
in scope is that it was not conceived as a contribution to climate action161 
Reviving the EGA talks can help deliver on both the Paris Agreement and trade 
liberalisation in times of increasing trade barriers. It seems likely that, for the time being, the 
EGA negotiations remain stalled,162 as in some key capitals the agreement does not seem to be 
a priority. 163 Arguably, it may be possible to resume the negotiations following the 12th WTO 
Ministerial Conference in 2019.164 In short, while EGA negotiations may be revived in the short 
to medium term, it remains to be seen whether the barriers mentioned above can be addressed. 
 
Option 3B: Including climate-friendly provisions in RTAs under negotiation and in future 
RTAs 
Environmental provisions in RTAs have become increasingly far-reaching. Early RTAs were 
merely replicating the WTO’s environmental provisions. By now, however, there are multiple 
ways in which environment- or more specifically climate-related provisions are included in 
RTAs.165 Climate change-related provisions could be included in RTAs either as part of the 
main text or as a side-agreement. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the first RTA to be 
accompanied by a side-agreement on the environment (not specifically on climate change). 
Subsequent RTAs have followed suit, either with side-agreements or with chapters and 
provisions relating to the environment and sustainability that are integrated into the text of the 
agreement itself. 
While in some agreements they take the form of general statements of intent, many 
RTAs go further and include specific commitments to operationalise such statements. The 
concrete provisions could be expressed in various forms, such as:  
 waivers or windows to avoid conflicts with climate change provisions (and other 
provisions related to sustainable development); 
 deeper cooperation arrangements specified in side-agreements and other chapters 
of RTAs; or 
 enhanced trade and investment in specific sectors of relevance to climate change, 
such as environmental goods and services, renewable energy, carbon markets, 
organic agriculture, sustainable transport, sustainably harvested forests, etc.166 
Based on an extensive review, Morin and Jinnah167 argue that, despite their variety, climate-
related provisions in RTAs continue to remain weak because, (a) they are poorly designed from 
a legal perspective; (b) they have failed to diffuse across RTAs, especially compared with other 
environmental issues; and (c) they have not been taken up by large greenhouse gas emitters. 
The EU has played a significant role on this front. The bloc started including 
environmental provisions in its RTAs with third countries in the mid-1990s.168 Recent RTAs 
negotiated by the EU systematically include provisions on sustainable development. Their aim 
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is to maximise the leverage of increased trade and investment to fight against climate change, 
among other issues.169 The sustainable development chapters of the EU free trade agreements 
(FTAs) have, in broad terms, worked well.170 Whereas all sustainable development chapters in 
recent EU FTAs include provisions on trade and climate change, those negotiated in the era of 
Paris Agreement (including the FTAs with Singapore, Vietnam, and Japan) would contain 
stronger and more detailed provisions in this area. These will (a) reaffirm a shared commitment 
to the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement, (b) commit the parties to close 
cooperation in the fight against climate change, and (c) commit the parties to agree on and carry 
out joint actions.171 In another significant move, in early 2018 the EU took the decision to refuse 
to sign trade deals with countries that do not ratify the Paris Agreement.172 
Another notable example is CETA - the Canada-European Union Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement which carves out a number of important provisions to support 
climate action. For instance, all tariffs on all goods – including a growing cluster of low-carbon 
products and related specialised services – are now or soon will be at zero. CETA also sets out 
new provisions to enable the exchange of professionals; and opens new and substantial 
opportunities in public procurement.173 
Extending such practices, there are various ways to include climate-friendly provisions 
in RTAs undergoing negotiation, as well as in future RTAs. 
RTAs can play an important role at a time of lower interest in WTO rule-making. 
Regionalism could also be a good avenue to promote regulatory cooperation and harmonisation 
across major economies without going through the slower multilateral process. For example, 
even though negotiations were halted in 2016, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership could have led to the harmonisation of carbon trading and biofuel policies across 
Europe and North America.174 
However, the political feasibility of including climate-friendly provisions in prospective 
RTAs may vary from one country or region to another,175 particularly if the provisions are 
formulated in binding terms. If the climate-related provisions in RTAs are non-binding, the 
political feasibility may increase.176 Overall, therefore, this option seems to have medium 
potential in the short term. 
 
Option 3C: Reviewing and renegotiating existing RTAs in light of their contribution to the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement and NDCs 
This option could potentially be relevant for all countries that have entered into RTAs and are 
working on implementing the Paris Agreement. For instance, following the pioneering 
initiatives taken by the EU in advancing the climate change objectives of the Paris Agreement 
through RTAs (as discussed above), the bloc could intensify its review processes of existing 
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RTAs.177 Any such initiative could check the extent to which existing RTAs can support the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement and related NDCs. This could be followed by 
cooperation – or possible renegotiation – with the trade partners to correct possible 
disincentives or hurdles. Such review processes could also become part of regular reviews 
and/or wider reviews of RTAs. The recent renewal of the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 
which aimed at updating the deal signed in 2000, is a case in point. In this case, both parties 
committed to effectively implementing their obligations under the Paris Agreement.178 
However, as shown by the ongoing renegotiation of the NAFTA,179 there are concerns that re-
opening an RTA could also sometimes risk weakening existing provisions on environment and 
climate change, depending on the agenda of the parties to the RTA. 
While a review, or even a renegotiation, of the existing RTAs for climate change 
purposes may be a plausible proposition for countries or regions that are seeking to take a lead 
on climate action (e.g. the EU), this may not hold true for all countries. Given that renegotiating 
RTAs, in general, may be a politically difficult proposition180 for some countries, their 
renegotiation for climate purposes may also not be a highly plausible option.181 In addition, this 
depends to a large extent on the relative position of power of the negotiating party championing 
climate issues and concerns. Another practical risk is that the renegotiation of RTAs for climate 
purposes could trigger a broader review of the agreement, well beyond climate-related aspects. 
This possibility may render countries reluctant to open up an RTA for review. 
However, some RTAs may embed periodical review provisions or termination dates, 
which provide an explicit reason to review and renegotiate them after a specified time period. 
In case an RTA is undergoing such a review, it may be possible to reconsider its climate 
dimensions and take corrective actions accordingly. Overall, this option appears to be unlikely 
at least in the short term. Including climate-friendly provisions in new RTAs (Option 3B) is 
arguably easier to accomplish politically than reviewing and renegotiating existing RTAs.182 
 
D. Category 4: Border Carbon Adjustments 
 
Border carbon adjustments are trade-related policy instruments to offset differences in the 
stringency of climate policies between trade partners. They do so by imposing a tax or other 
regulatory measure on imports based on their carbon content and/or by exempting exports from 
domestic carbon constraints.  
BCAs have been periodically discussed as a way to address concerns about emissions 
leakage (when climate action in one region merely shifts the incidence of emissions elsewhere) 
and to incentivise climate-laggard nations to adopt more ambitious climate policies.183  
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However, BCAs are often regarded as being at risk of violating the WTO law. First, it 
is not clear whether a domestic tax based on the carbon content of a product could be eligible 
for adjustment at the border.184 Moreover, even if a domestic carbon tax is determined to be 
adjustable at the border, it has to be ensured in addition that the concomitant border tax 
adjustment abides by the national treatment5 requirements, which is another pillar of the non-
discrimination principle of the WTO, besides the MFN (which also has to be complied with). 
Another big question that comes up in this context pertains to that of “like” products: whether 
under the WTO jurisprudence products can be regarded as “non-like” only on the basis of their 
differing carbon content. There is a significant uncertainty in the existing WTO jurisprudence 
on this question as well, which adds further to the ambiguities pertaining to the WTO legality 
of any border carbon adjustment (BCA) measure.185 
Several concrete changes to the trade regime have been suggested to facilitate the 
deployment of BCAs without violating trade rules. In this section we consider six options.  
Although each of these options would contribute to greater legal certainty and coherence 
across regimes, the required political endorsement will likely be difficult to secure.186 Given 
the political sensitivity of BCAs, even informal avenues of cooperation, for instance to promote 
dialogue about their use, have faced resistance in the past. This was the case when Singapore 
attempted, and ultimately failed, to launch a discussion of BCAs in the WTO CTE.187 
Tactically, some of these options (the amendment to WTO law, the waiver, the 
authoritative interpretation and the peace clause) also harbour the risk of limiting future 
flexibility and making it more difficult to justify BCAs or other climate measures. A majority 
among legal scholars holds that appropriately designed BCAs aimed at preventing leakage can 
already pass muster under current WTO law.188 But any attempts to adopt these options might 
signal that BCAs are illegal without further steps, such as a waiver. Also, like other climate 
policy options, BCAs can take different shapes: any legal steps to allow a narrowly defined 
BCA could thus exclude variations on that specific design. Rather than helping promote climate 
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action, these measures would then, e contrario, serve to limit future latitude for domestic 
climate policies outside their scope.189 
 
Option 4A: Amending WTO rules for BCAs 
An effective way of addressing possible inconsistencies between BCAs and WTO law would 
be to seek an amendment of the GATT and other relevant WTO rules to explicitly allow 
BCAs.190 This could be implemented in direct and indirect ways: 
 Directly, a change to Articles III.2 (national treatment provision) and II.2.a (border 
tax adjustment provision) of the GATT  could positively state the permissibility of 
border adjustments for climate policies; similarly, an amendment to Articles I191 
and III of the GATT (and potentially also Article 3 of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM)) could explicitly exempt BCAs 
from relevant trade disciplines. 
 Indirectly, changes to WTO rules that would affirm the legality of BCAs could 
include a provision allowing reliance on processes and production methods (PPMs) 
to differentiate between otherwise ‘like’ products,192 or incorporate language into 
Article XX of the GATT to expressly cover climate policy measures in that 
provision’s exceptions.193 At present Article XX194 covers environmental 
exceptions, but not climate change-related exceptions per se. 
While each of these amendments could be a powerful way to address concerns about the legality 
of BCAs, their feasibility in the short and medium term is very limited. This is due to the 
controversial nature of BCAs and the high political and procedural hurdles imposed on changes 
to the WTO Agreements (see Option 1A above).195 
As scientific and political understanding of the urgency to deal with climate change 
evolves over time, the persistent and far-reaching asymmetry between a majority of progressive 
climate actors and a limited number of obstructionists might alter the perception of BCAs and 
the ability to muster sufficient political support for an amendment in the long term. 
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Option 4B: Adopting a Waiver for BCAs 
A further option to reduce legal uncertainty around BCAs is a temporary waiver of WTO 
obligations pursuant to Article IX.3 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO (see Option 
1Babove). Such a waiver could, for instance, suspend the application of Articles I and III of the 
GATT to differentiate products based on carbon content, coupled with an assurance of mutual 
restraint from legal disputes. In addition, a waiver could set out criteria and design principles 
for BCAs to ensure a more harmonized application.196 
Given their temporary nature, waivers have proven somewhat more amenable to WTO 
Members,197 but the requirement of ‘exceptional circumstances’ and the necessary voting 
threshold render them only moderately more viable than amendments of WTO law (see Option 
1B). Still, their temporary nature could make them an interesting option to facilitate a time-
limited introduction of a BCA as a means to stimulate the debate among WTO Members198 and 
incentivise more symmetrical climate action. The need for BCAs would thus be overcome over 
time. 
 
Option 4C: Adopting an Authoritative Interpretation to Allow BCAs 
Instead of an amendment to WTO rules, WTO Members could opt for an authoritative 
interpretation of relevant provisions in the GATT and other WTO Agreements about the legal 
status of BCAs. Such an authoritative interpretation could, for instance, declare that BCAs are 
consistent with obligations under the WTO Agreement, notably Articles I and III of the GATT, 
or that they fall within the scope of Article XX of the GATT. Importantly, an authoritative 
interpretation could become a means to correct a judicial interpretation against BCAs under the 
WTO dispute settlement system.199 While, according to Article IX.2 of the WTO Agreement, a 
three-fourths majority of WTO Members is required to approve an authoritative interpretation, 
once adopted this takes effect for all WTO members without requiring ratification (see Option 
1Cabove). Still, overcoming this threshold will be difficult, rendering the feasibility of this 
option low in the short and medium term.  
 
Option 4D: Agreeing on a ‘Peace Clause’ for BCAs 
Less ambitious in scope than an amendment or authoritative interpretation is the adoption of a 
time-limited moratorium or ‘peace clause’. Based on this option, WTO Members would wait 
before challenging a BCA under the WTO dispute settlement system, or refrain from using 
countermeasures against the imposition of a BCA. On the other hand, a peace clause could also 
be used to suspend the application of a BCA for a specified period of time, for instance three 
years, during which affected trade partners could enter into negotiations on how to strengthen 
climate action so that the BCA is not required.200 As a temporary instrument, the purpose of the 
peace clause would be to buy time to find a permanent resolution. 
In terms of its political feasibility, however, a peace clause adopted at the international 
level would face significant obstacles (see Option 2A above). It could also be implemented with 
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more limited scope at the national level, for instance if cooperating countries decide to include 
relevant language in their domestic climate legislation on a reciprocal basis.201 While the 
feasibility of such a decentralised approach might be greater, the scope will be far more limited. 
 
Option 4E: Amending the Harmonized System  
A further option to implement changes in the international trade regime to favour BCAs would 
be to modify the product classification system used in trade negotiations, the World Custom 
Organization’s Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), in order to 
account for different processes and production methods.202 The HS was developed by the World 
Customs Organization and contains a nomenclature of products in about 5,000 commodity 
groups. It serves more than 200 countries as a basis for their customs tariffs and for trade 
statistics. The HS covers over 98 per cent of internationally traded merchandise.203 This 
nomenclature is revised every five years and the last update entered into force on 1 January 
2017.204 
Conceivably, the HS classification could be revised to distinguish goods based on the 
carbon-intensity of their PPMs, offering a more solid foundation for differentiation with a BCA. 
This could provide a basis for assessing the emissions performance of traded goods (i.e. their 
carbon content) as far as information is available. This idea has been brought up in the context 
of the Environmental Goods Agreement, as discrimination of goods based on their 
environmental performance would be needed in order to design a tariff system that favours the 
environmentally performing (e.g. allowing duty-free trade in solar panels). 
In practice, however, such an amendment to the HS would prove difficult or even 
impossible to apply for all products where general distinctions of carbon content are technically 
not feasible. An example that could work would be to differentiate steel produced from blast 
oxygen furnaces (high energy intensity) or from electric arc furnaces (low energy intensity). 
However, for aluminium this does not seem workable, as it would mean differentiating based 
on the energy source used to power the aluminium smelting (renewable energy or fossil energy 
sources). 
Politically, it also does not appear viable in the short term and beyond.205 Article 16 of 
the International Convention on the Harmonized System requires consensus for amendments to 
the nomenclature and any Contracting Party is allowed to veto changes proposed by the Council 
based on recommendations of the Harmonized System Committee. Also, amendments to the 
HS are only made every five years, and the latest round was concluded in 2017, meaning that 
the next opportunity will only arise around 2022. This option therefore faces a similar hurdle 
as an outright amendment of WTO law, but the latter avoids the foregoing technical difficulties. 
One factor in favour of this option is ongoing progress with carbon disclosure and foot printing 
methodologies, which may over time reduce the technical barriers to a more differentiated HS 
nomenclature.206 
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Option 4F: Regional or plurilateral cooperation on BCAs 
At present, any legal or procedural changes in the trade regime that require consensus among, 
or approval by, a large majority of countries (such as the WTO membership) appears politically 
unfeasible. This is due to divisions about the urgency of and the adequate response to climate 
change, the controversial nature of BCAs, as well as the broader setbacks in international trade 
negotiations. A more viable option might therefore lie in seeking progress at a plurilateral or 
regional level among like-minded countries. The advantage of such an approach is that non-
participating countries cannot block the negotiations. Countries negotiating a regional trade 
agreement, for instance, could specify the permissibility and legal conditions of BCAs, and 
commit to mutual restraint in terms of challenging BCAs that meet these conditions.207 Parties 
could also explicitly declare the right to invoke Article XX of the GATT to justify BCAs.208 
Beyond setting out basic principles and conditions for BCAs, they could further adopt a code 
of conduct or good practice209 specifying permissible design elements and applications, 
notification and cooperation procedures, and even an institutional structure to facilitate 
capacity-building, oversight, implementation, and review of BCAs.210 The design elements 
could also ensure that this approach avoids becoming a disguised form of protectionism. One 
option to address the concerns of developing countries, for instance, would be to earmark the 
related revenues for climate finance transfers to developing countries.211 
Although no coalition has so far emerged to advance BCAs, appeals to consider them 
as a policy option have repeatedly surfaced in several countries.212 This suggests potential 
political support for more formal cooperation on BCA design and implementation. Until such 
a coalition emerges, however, it remains unclear whether endorsement of BCAs among like-
minded countries would have meaningful benefits for the climate, as these countries would in 
all probability already have largely aligned climate policies. For maximum effectiveness, this 
form of cooperation would have to involve all major emitting countries, including some – such 
as the United States – which are not currently endorsing ambitious climate action. Still, over 
time, a coalition approach could create a nucleus around which other countries might converge, 
eventually shifting the political and legal discussion around BCAs.213 Prospectively, such 
cooperation could even result in a plurilateral agreement under Annex 4 of the WTO 
Agreement, formally integrating this decentralised option into the international trade regime. 
While adoption of such a plurilateral agreement would still require consensus among all WTO 
Members (cf. Article IX.9 of the WTO Agreement), it might be more feasible than an 
amendment of WTO rules or an authoritative interpretation because it would not diminish the 
rights of non-subscribing WTO Members.214 
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E. Category 5: Addressing Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
 
The adverse environmental, economic and social implications of the sizable subsidies handed 
out by governments for the production and consumption of fossil fuels are increasingly clear. 
The sheer size of these subsidies is a significant burden to the public purse. Although estimates 
by different international organisations vary, even the most conservative amounts are huge. For 
instance, a relative conservative estimate by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
suggests that fossil fuel subsidies added up to US$ 373 billion in 2015.215 These fossil fuel 
subsidies also divert investment from other, often more pressing, development objectives such 
as health care and education. Moreover, by promoting the burning of fossil fuels, they 
contribute to climate change and help lock in carbon-intensive energy systems. Importantly, by 
affecting fossil fuel prices, subsidies can have distorting impacts on trade and investment. 
As the main international organisation to discipline subsidies, attention has been drawn 
to the potential role of the WTO in addressing support to fossil fuels.216 As WTO Members are 
slowly making progress in the negotiations to create new disciplines for another type of 
environmentally harmful subsidies, those for fisheries, a range of options has been put forward 
to address through the WTO fossil fuel subsidies too. However, the implementation of any of 
these options will likely face the same political and legal hurdles that made WTO action on this 
issue challenging thus far. These include the fact that WTO law at present ‘under-captures’ 
fossil fuel subsidies compared to renewable energy subsidies. This is because fossil fuel 
subsidies are often not ‘specific’ in the sense of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, and adverse trade effects caused by them are difficult to prove.217 
Perhaps this is why fossil fuel subsidies have not been challenged before the WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
Nonetheless, opportunities to start addressing fossil fuel subsidies within the WTO and 
other international trade agreements are plentiful.218 This section reviews six such options.  
 
Option 5A: Promoting Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Related to Fossil Fuel 
Subsidies 
Fossil fuel subsidies could be included in existing WTO initiatives on capacity-building and 
provision of technical assistance, 219 as well as initiatives undertaken in partnership with other 
international organisations. 
This could help WTO Members identify fossil fuel subsidies that they need to notify, 
strengthening the transparency around this issue (see also Option 5B). Although there is 
growing agreement among experts on how to define and measure fossil fuel 
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subsidies,220capacity-building efforts may assist governments in identifying specifically those 
subsidies that fall under the under the definition set out by the WTO ASCM. Conceivably, 
technical assistance could also help build capacity to reform subsidies, as knowledge about their 
existence is a key precondition for reform.221  
However, given that other international and non-governmental organisations such as the 
World Bank (and its Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme222), the IMF and the 
Global Subsidies Initiative are already active in this field, coordination would be needed to 
avoid a duplication of efforts, otherwise the added value of the WTO’s involvement would be 
questionable.223Moreover, without a clear mandate from Members,224 it would be difficult for 
the Secretariat to focus technical assistance specifically on fossil fuel subsidies, as opposed to 
subsidies in general.225 In addition, the potential feasibility of this option is limited in that 
technical assistance and capacity-building by the WTO Secretariat have to be linked to the 
implementation of the WTO Agreements. Although there are WTO obligations applying to 
subsidies in general (e.g. notification under Article 25 ASCM), there are no specific obligations 
related to fossil fuel subsidies. Providing technical assistance for subsidy reform is very likely 
outside the WTO Secretariat mandate, and would require specific expertise and resources that 
other international and non-governmental organisations possess.226 
Technical assistance and capacity-building for fossil fuel subsidies may be more 
feasible if carried out as part of a broader effort to improve general compliance with the ASCM 
obligations.227 Moreover, if any new agreement on disciplines specifically focused on fossil 
fuel subsidies were to be adopted (see Options 5E and 5F), it may be possible to link technical 
assistance and capacity-building to those disciplines. Overall, however, the feasibility of this 
option seems low in the short-term, but may be higher in the medium- to long-term.  
 
Option 5B: Strengthening Transparency of Fossil Fuel Subsidies through Increased 
Disclosure 
Under the ASCM, WTO Members are obliged to notify their subsidies.228 However, the 
notification record of fossil fuel subsidies is patchy (in line with broader notification 
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deficiencies).229 To improve notifications, Members could, alone or with other Members, start 
to voluntarily notify fossil fuel subsidies under the ASCM. Self-reporting could help 
governments and other stakeholders better understand what subsidies are being granted, and 
track efforts to reform them over time. Although, as the Group of 20 (G20) experience has 
demonstrated,230 self-reporting may mean that only a limited number of subsidies are notified, 
it is a first step towards more transparency. 
Beyond strengthening notifications on a voluntary basis, Bacchus suggests to strengthen 
the enforceability of existing notification obligations by ‘[m]andat[ing] full disclosure of fossil 
fuel subsidies under WTO rules’.231 This option would likely require an amendment (see Option 
5E), as Article 25 of the ASCM (on notification) does not specify which types of subsidies 
should be notified beyond those meeting the definition of Articles 1–2,232 and does not specify 
any consequences for incomplete notifications. While mandatory disclosure would require an 
amendment, another option already possible within existing rules is counter-notification, with 
one Member bringing to the attention a measure by another Member that should have been 
notified.233 
In addition to notifications under the ASCM, fossil fuel subsidies (and their reform) 
have also been discussed in Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) under the TPRM (see also Option 
2B above). Members alone, or working together, could continue to raise issues related to fossil 
fuel subsidies in this process. Going further, the Trade Policy Review Body could ask the 
Secretariat to pay attention to fossil fuel support in its discussion of subsidies for the energy 
sector, drawing on external sources such as G20 peer reviews.234 While some Members have 
encouraged the Secretariat to do so,235 fossil fuel subsidies are not yet systematically evaluated. 
Generally, improved transparency could help shed light on the subsidies provided, 
especially by countries that are not reporting or undergoing reviews in other forums. Moreover, 
transparency can help avoid the emergence of disputes, instead generating dialogue and 
promoting clarity, as well as options for reform.236 However, any effort to strengthen 
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transparency should ensure that it does not duplicate data collection efforts already taking place 
in other international organisations and forums,237 including in the SDGs process.238 
In terms of feasibility of transparency initiatives, options related to using the TPRM 
seem most feasible in the short-term.239 Countries belonging to the Friends of Fossil Fuel 
Subsidy Reform already seek to consistently raise the issue in their questions and statements 
under the TPRM, usually with a view of encouraging progress by other Members.240 Although 
the WTO Secretariat could seek to collect more systematically data on fossil fuel subsidies 
without formal approval of Members, it does require resources.241 In addition, if the Secretariat 
were to start doing so only for fossil fuel subsidies, it would likely raise questions from WTO 
Members. 
Self-notification could be a next step on the way to a mandatory system, but it would 
require some Members to take the lead and be confident that their notifications would not 
necessarily lead to a challenge before the WTO dispute settlement system. The Friends of Fossil 
Fuel Subsidy Reform242 could be one such group.243 The feasibility of counter-notifications is 
limited in that they are likely to trigger detailed scrutiny of the counter-notifying Member’s 
own notifications.244 
Lastly, any mandatory obligation to disclose fossil fuel subsidies would likely run into 
significant opposition, at least in the short- to medium-term. Generally, new notification 
requirements would likely only be accepted if accompanied by new rules focused specifically 
on fossil fuel subsidies, as can be seen in the cases of agriculture and fisheries subsidies (the 
latter still under negotiation).245 Nonetheless, transparency of fossil fuel subsidies could be 
addressed in proposals to improve notifications on subsidies in general (e.g. as tabled by the 
European Union in 2018246) or notifications in general (e.g. as tabled by the United States in 
2017247).248 
Strengthening transparency under the WTO could receive a boost if progress is made a 
part of the SDGs process. Under SDG 12.c.1, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) is leading efforts to develop a methodology for measuring fossil fuel subsidies. If this 
methodology is adopted, UNEP would be responsible for collecting data on UN Members for 
the period 2020–2030. This could reinforce efforts under the WTO, including on 
notifications.249 More generally, increasing available data on Members’ subsidies can exert a 
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positive influence on transparency under the WTO.250 Another way to pursue this objective at 
the WTO is by strengthening transparency through regional trade agreements.251 
In short, strengthening transparency through the WTO is feasible in the short-term on a 
voluntary as opposed to mandatory) basis, specifically through the TPRM process, where issues 
related to fossil fuel subsidies can be raised by some Members. However, strengthening fossil 
fuel subsidy notifications will likely require some Members to set the example, or will need to 
be linked to broader proposals on strengthening notifications.  
 
Option 5C: Pledge-and-Review of Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
There is another option to strengthen transparency. WTO Members, again, acting alone 
or in a small group with other Members, could make a non-binding pledge to eliminate or 
progressively reduce their fossil fuel subsidies. They could then follow up reporting progress 
and reviewing each other’s advances.252 The regular pledge of subsidy reform could make it 
part of a bargaining process, allowing Members to trade-off commitments to reform fossil fuel 
subsidies with other trade-related commitments.253 
The rationale of this option would be to extend existing pledge-and-review processes 
on fossil fuel subsidies (notably the voluntary peer reviews under the G20 and APEC) to other 
WTO Members. The adoption of (voluntary) commitments by states to reform or remove fossil 
fuel subsidies can increase the reputational costs of reneging on that commitment.254 The 
process itself could even be seen as a confidence-building exercise that could pave the way for 
binding disciplines on fossil fuel subsidies, through which countries could show that they are 
undertaking reform and get acknowledgement for their achievements through an institution 
such as the WTO.255 
The feasibility of this option may be constrained given that making voluntary pledges 
is not a common process in the context of the WTO. Moreover, Members may fear being 
challenged before WTO dispute settlement if they fail to fulfil their pledges.256 
Like other options, the feasibility would increase if a small group of countries rather 
than the whole WTO membership were involved.257 The group could seek to enact this 
informally, by launching such a process on the margins of a WTO meeting.258 However, if it 
were to be a formal initiative under the WTO, the option would likely need the support of at 
least G20 and APEC members to avoid a duplication of efforts.259 While these groups have 
made commitments to phase out and rationalise inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, getting their 
members, including the world’s largest economies, to follow-up under the umbrella of the WTO 
presents a significant political hurdle. Another challenge would be to convince WTO Members 
that the WTO rather than, for instance, the United Nations’ High-Level Political Forum on 
Sustainable Development260 is an appropriate venue for extending pledge-and-review to 
countries other than the G20 and APEC.261 
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The short-term feasibility of pursuing this option within the WTO therefore seems low, 
but a small group of Members acting outside the formal process on a voluntary basis would 
increase its chances. 
 
Option 5D: Adopting a Political Declaration on Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
A further option is for WTO Members, or a subset thereof, to adopt a political 
declaration on fossil fuel subsidies. Such an initiative could take the form of statements of intent 
regarding fossil fuel subsidies in the context of the WTO. For instance, although discussions in 
the CTE occasionally touch upon the issue, Members could agree to continue discussing fossil 
fuel or wider energy subsidies within the CTE, and specify that the CTE’s mandate should 
include discussions on how they could be reformed within the WTO. Moreover, WTO Members 
could more generally state their support for addressing the issue under the WTO. The 2017 
‘Fossil Fuel Subsidies Reform Ministerial Statement’, adopted by 12 Members at the 11th 
Ministerial Conference (MC11) of the WTO, is an example.262 However, the number of 
signatories was relatively limited. Friends members that are also EU Member States (Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden) were not able to sign up because the EU as a whole did not sign up.263  
In terms of feasibility, the question therefore is whether more countries will be willing 
to sign up to it in the future. A separate Communiqué264 by the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy 
Reform (released, outside the trade context, in 2015) was endorsed by other countries outside 
the group (including G7 members Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United 
States). This shows that more countries are supportive of the issue,265 but it remains to be seen 
whether they are also willing to address the issue in the context of the WTO. 
Mobilisation of other countries by the existing signatories will be needed.266 The 
challenge will be to move the issue forward by becoming more concrete, while at the same time 
also attracting more support. Nonetheless, it can be seen as positive that the initial declaration 
was signed by 12 Members. In comparison, the first statement in the WTO on the need to 
address fisheries subsidies was made by only one Member, New Zealand, in 1998.267 In the 
case of fisheries subsidies, however, initial political declarations were followed up by concrete 
proposals. This would need to happen as well for the political declaration on fossil fuel 
subsidies.268 
In short, while the feasibility of (further) political declarations on fossil fuel subsidies 
is high, questions remain about the number of Members prepared to sign up, and whether future 
text can go beyond the MC11 ministerial statement taking concrete steps towards the adoption 
of commitments or disciplines on fossil fuel subsidies at the WTO. 
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Option 5E: Amending the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures so as to 
Address Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
Another way of addressing the issue through the WTO would be to change existing disciplines 
for fossil fuel subsidies. This could be done, for instance, by including fossil fuel support as a 
category of prohibited subsidies (in addition to export subsidies and local content subsidies) 
under Article 3 of the ASCM.269 Any such provision need not apply to all fossil fuel subsidies, 
but could be limited to a specific sub-set, for instance based on particular trade-related or 
environmental effects. This, in turn, may require a change to the ‘adverse effects’ criterion of 
the ASCM, which currently only focuses on adverse trade effects. Pereira proposes a 
prohibition for ‘the most egregious kinds of subsidies’ to fossil fuels, including those for new 
coal-fired power plants, for new fossil fuel exploration and extraction, or for infrastructure for 
the fossil fuel industry.270 Even if limited in scope, a prohibition could provide a strong signal, 
backed by the WTO’s dispute settlement system, pushing countries to phase out this specific 
support. 
Multilateral and regional negotiations on fisheries subsidies could be used as an example 
of how to distinguish between different types of measures in this regard. For instance, the 
targeting of subsidies used to support illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) draft demonstrates how trading partners can agree on a specific 
category of prohibited subsidies.271 The TPP seeks to link subsidy prohibitions to ‘negative 
effects’ (based on ‘the best scientific evidence available’) on overfishing.272 Similarly, in the 
WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies, it was suggested to prohibit a wide range of measures 
taking into account the particular characteristics of the sector.273 
Any prohibition could take into account the type of Member and provide for special and 
differential treatment, e.g. exempting least developed countries or linking to provisions on 
technical assistance and capacity-building. Exemptions could also be made for countries that 
can prove subsidies are needed to support low-income communities, or prohibitions could be 
phased in gradually for some or all countries.274 
Expanding the category of prohibited subsidies would amount to an amendment, and 
would as such be subject to the constraints outlined under Option 1A. But even before an 
amendment could be agreed upon, there would need to be a negotiating mandate. Given that no 
new negotiating mandates have been agreed since the Doha Round, and with a reluctance of a 
group of WTO Members to address new issues when the existing negotiating mandate has not 
been concluded, it is unlikely that discussions on amending the ASCM would start any time 
                                                 
 
269 G. Horlick & P.A. Clarke, Rethinking Subsidy Disciplines for the Future, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE 
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2016), at 14. 
270 H. Pereira, H. (2017), How the WTO Can Help Tackle Climate Change through Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform: 
Lessons from the Fisheries Negotiations, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
(2017), at 13–14. See also J.P. Trachtman, supra note 220.  
271 TPP, Article 20.16.5(b). 
272 TPP, Article 201.16.5(a). 
273 World Trade Organization, Draft Consolidated Chair’s Text of the AD and SCM Agreements, WTO Doc. 
TN/RL/W/213 (November 30, 2007), Annex VIII, Article I. One proposed prohibition specifically related to the 
environmental impact of the subsidy: ‘any subsidy … the benefits of which are conferred on any fishing vessel or 
fishing activity affecting fish stocks that are in an unequivocally overfished condition shall be prohibited’ (supra 
Annex VIII, Article I.2). 
274 Verkuijl et al., supra note 220. 
41 
 
soon.275 Even in the case of fisheries subsidies, negotiations have continued for almost 20 years, 
and have not been concluded yet.276  
More generally, a challenge would be to get the prohibition right. While proposals 
focusing on a specific set of fossil fuel subsidies may be successful, it would be difficult, for 
instance, to achieve common ground on which subsidies are ‘the most egregious’ or under 
which conditions exemptions may apply. A historical example also suggests that prohibitions 
lead to calls for exemptions. The 1951 Treaty of Paris, which created the European Coal and 
Steel Community (the precursor to the EU) prohibited all coal (and steel) subsidies, but within 
little more than a decade, derogations from that prohibition had become commonplace.277 
Having said that, the possible conclusion of negotiations on fisheries subsidies 
disciplines may offer an important precedent, and generate momentum towards disciplines on 
fossil fuel subsidies in the longer run.278 While the prospects for an amendment are therefore 
low in the short- to medium-term, they may improve in the long-term. 
 
Option 5F: A New WTO Agreement on Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
Although new disciplines for fossil fuel subsidies could be incorporated into the ASCM through 
an amendment, another option is to adopt a separate WTO Agreement on Fossil Fuel Subsidies. 
This could be concluded as a plurilateral agreement among a subset of WTO Members.279 The 
advantage of a focused approach would be the limitation of the risk to open up other issues and 
subsidies within the same discussion. 
The prospects of a specific agreement, even a plurilateral one, depend very much on 
some of the major countries (in terms of trade flows and size of these subsidies) getting on 
board (e.g. China, EU, Japan, US). At present, securing their participation is likely to be 
difficult.280 However, the critical mass needed for an Agreement on Fossil Fuel Subsidies is 
ultimately a political decision by its proponents.281 
Even if plurilateral negotiations are launched, it may be hard to reach an agreement, as 
ongoing negotiations among seemingly like-minded countries on the Environmental Goods 
Agreement and the Trade in Services Agreement show.282 It would be important for the 
participating countries to be convinced of the benefits of reforming subsidies, knowing that 
others may not take the same action.283 The agreement could cover energy subsidies, or energy 
sector reform284 more broadly, giving countries with an interest in renewable energy subsidies 
an incentive to participate. While it would be more complex, it may also be more politically 
palatable.285 
In short, any new Agreement on Fossil Fuel Subsidies seems likely only in the medium 
to long term. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This article has analysed a range of policy options to improve coherence between the 
international trading system and climate action in greater depth than the existing literature has 
done so far. It sheds light on what options may be worth exploring further by trade and climate 
policymakers, non-governmental organisations and international organisations interested in 
ensuring that the international trading system helps to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.  
We argue that legal changes at the WTO appear to be difficult in the near future, particularly in 
the current geopolitical climate of trade wars among key Members like the United States286 and 
China, and the ongoing impasse regarding the appointment of new Appellate Body judges. 
 
The low prospect of legal changes in the WTO does not mean, however, that all possibilities 
for the trade system to work for climate action are exhausted. It only means that other policy 
options need to be explored.  
 
Based on our analysis, we propose the following six ways to support the Paris Agreement in 
the near term. 
(i) Leverage regional trade agreements (RTAs): This could be done by including climate-
related provisions in new RTAs. In addition, countries can review and renegotiate 
existing RTAs for this purpose. 
(ii) Engage in plurilateral efforts with like-minded WTO Members (e.g. Environmental 
Goods Agreement): Policy-makers, for instance in the EU and China, could revive the 
stalled negotiations on the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA). In particular, they 
should focus on defining environmental goods and identifying the common interest of 
the parties involved. New plurilateral agreements or cooperative engagement on specific 
areas, such as border carbon adjustments and fossil fuel subsidy reform, could also be 
explored (see below).  
(iii) Use WTO and UNFCCC forums more intensively: Existing institutional exchange and 
coordination between forums such as the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment 
(CTE) and the UNFCCC’s ‘Improved Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of 
the Response Measures’ should be intensified. This could be done by systematically 
addressing climate change through the CTE, by carrying out studies on the impacts of 
trade-related climate policies through the Improved Forum, and by regular meetings 
between the WTO and UNFCCC secretariats. 
(iv) Include climate-related issues in the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) on 
a voluntary basis: WTO Members would voluntarily include a gradually increasing 
amount of information on their climate-related trade measures, and vice versa. Members 
could raise climate-related queries during trade policy reviews. 
(v) Advance border carbon adjustments (BCAs) in a coalition of like-minded countries: 
Though BCAs have been controversial in the past, by working together on the design 
and implementation of BCAs, like-minded countries could ensure that this policy does 
not turn into a disguised form of protectionism. They could agree on accepted features 
of a BCA, and reciprocally pledge not to contest a BCA imposed by one participating 
country against another. Over time, the group of countries could expand, becoming a 
catalyst for broader and eventually multilateral action.  
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(vi) Promote fossil fuel subsidy reform through a group of WTO Members: Fossil fuel 
subsidies are already addressed by a small group of WTO Members in the context of 
trade policy reviews, and a group of 12 countries adopted a ministerial statement in 2017 
calling on the WTO to discipline them. A way forward would be to gradually expand 
the group of countries raising fossil fuel subsidies in the WTO to include Members 
responsible for sizeable subsidies (such as China, the EU, India and the United States). 
Moreover, Members can help increase transparency by voluntary notification of fossil 
fuel subsidies, and continuing to include such subsidies in trade policy reviews. 
The issue areas covered in this article are by no means exhaustive. Options related to other 
issues worth considering are manifold, for example subsidies for renewable energy, the use of 
free allocation in emissions trading systems, the transfer of climate-friendly technologies and 
intellectual property rights protection, promotion of climate-friendly investment, climate-
friendly government procurement.  However, covering all these issues is beyond the scope of 
this article. As we shed some light on general proposals which are relevant for those issues as 
well, we leave it to further research to draw on our results and analyse specificities in more 
detail. 287  
Although we have sought to present our reasoning for the feasibility of each option as 
clearly as possible, we acknowledge that feasibility is the result of a complex and dynamic set 
of factors that cannot all be captured and are difficult to predict. The assessment can serve as a 
compass of which options may be worth exploring in greater detail by those actors – including 
governments and non-state actors – keen to make the international trade system work for the 
promotion of climate protection.  
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Annex 1: Overview of Options 
 
 
 
Legal Changes at the 
WTO
1A: Amend text of WTO 
Agreements to explicitly 
accommodate climate 
measures
1B: Adopt a waiver 
relieving WTO Members 
from legal obligation under 
WTO Agreements
1C: Adopt an authoritative 
interpretation of WTO 
provisions 
1D: A temporary 'peace 
clause' for trade-related 
climate measures
Procedural Change in 
Institutions and 
Practices
2A: Ensure technical 
expertise on climate 
change in WTO dispute 
settlement panels 
2B: Include mandatory 
climate-related impact 
assessments in WTO Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism
2C: Enhance coordination 
between WTO and UNFCCC 
through more intensive 
use of existing forums
Actions under 
Plurilateral and 
Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs)
3A: Intensify efforts under 
plurilateral approaches, 
particularly the 
Environmental Goods 
Agreement 
3B: Include climate-friendly 
provisions in RTAs under 
negotiation and in future 
RTAs
3C: Review and 
renegotiate contribution to 
the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement
Border Carbon 
Adjustments (BCAs)
4A: Amend WTO rules for 
BCAs
4B: Adopt a waiver for 
BCAs
4C: Adopt an authoritative 
interpretation allowing 
BCAs
4D: Agree a ‘peace clause’ 
for BCAs
4E: Amend the Harmonized 
System
4F: Regional or plurilateral 
cooperation on BCAs
Fossil Fuel Subsidies
5A: Promote technical 
assistance and capacity-
building related to fossil 
fuel subsidies
5B: Strengthen 
transparency of fossil fuel 
subsidies through 
increased disclosure
5C: Pledge-and-review of 
fossil fuel subsidies
5D: Adopt a political 
declaration on fossil fuel 
subsidies
5E: Amend the Agreement 
on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 
to address fossil fuel 
subsidies
5F: A new WTO Agreement 
on Fossil Fuel Subsidies
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